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What is an AutoModerator? 
An AutoModerator is a bot designed to automate various moderation tasks 
that require little or no human judgement.  It can watch the new/spam/com-
ments/report queues of any subreddit it moderates and take actions on sub-
missions and comments based on defined conditions. This includes 
approving or removing them . . . . It is effectively fairly similar to reddit’s 
built-in spam-filter, but [also] allows for conditions to be defined specifically 
instead of just giving vague hints by removing/approving. Its decisions can 
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always be overridden by human mod[erators], exactly like an existing filter.1 
Introduction 
In March 2019, a shooter posted a white nationalist manifesto on 
“8chan,” an online message board, and then livestreamed on Facebook as 
he murdered fifty-one people at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zea-
land.2  In the aftermath of the shooting, millions of users viewed the video 
on YouTube and Facebook even as the sites struggled to keep the video 
offline.3  In July 2019, Brandon Clark murdered Bianca Devins and posted 
grisly pictures of her corpse on the social media platforms Instagram and 
Discord before attempting suicide and being arrested.4  The photos, tagged 
with the hashtag #RIPBianca, quickly spread throughout social media plat-
forms even as users flagged them and called the police in real time.5  On 
Yom Kippur of October 2019, another shooter live-streamed on Twitch, a 
gaming platform, as he murdered two people in a synagogue in Halle, 
Germany.6 
In the wake of these incidents, lawmakers around the world are closely 
scrutinizing “content moderation”— the set of practices that online plat-
forms use to screen, rank, filter, and block user-generated content.  One 
particularly notable regulatory strategy encourages platforms to use tech-
nology to prevent the dissemination of unlawful online content before it is 
1. What is AutoModerator?, REDDIT (2012), http://www.reddit.com/r/AutoModera-
tor/comments/q11pu/what_is_automoderator [https://perma.cc/2XRR-5525]. 
2. See Kevin Roose, A Mass Murder of, and for, the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
15, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/technology/facebook-youtube-christ 
church-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/XP8P-MCZR]. See also Richard Pérez-Peña, Two 
New Zealand Mosques, a Hate-Filled Massacre Designed for Its Time, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/world/australia/new-zealand-mosque-
shooting.html [https://perma.cc/B7AK-SC3L]. 
3. Elizabeth Dwoskin & Craig Timberg, Inside YouTube’s Struggles to Shut Down 
Video of the New Zealand Shooting— and the Humans Who Outsmarted Its Systems, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 18, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/ 
03/18/inside-youtubes-struggles-shut-down-video-new-zealand-shooting-humans-who-
outsmarted-its-systems/ [https://perma.cc/7HT9-7MNV]; Kate Klonick, Inside the Team 
at Facebook That Dealt with the Christchurch Shooting, NEW  YORKER (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/inside-the-team-at-facebook-that-dealt-
with-the-christchurch-shooting [https://perma.cc/UV28-2RKF] [hereinafter Inside the 
Team at Facebook That Dealt with the Christchurch Shooting]; Cade Metz & Adam Satari-
ano, Facebook Restricts Live Streaming After New Zealand Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/technology/facebook-live-violent-con-
tent.html [https://perma.cc/T2MH-5BPL]; Charlie Warzel, The New Zealand Massacre 
Was Made to Go Viral, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/ 
15/opinion/new-zealand-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/2YYT-M825]. 
4. Michael Gold, #RIPBianca: How a Teenager’s Brutal Murder Ended Up on 
Instagram, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/nyre-
gion/bianca-devins-death.html [https://perma.cc/44GK-7XLG]. 
5. Id.; Taylor Romine, Brandon Clark, Accused of Killing Internet Personality Bianca 
Devins, Pleads Not Guilty, CNN (July 29, 2019, 4:38 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/ 
07/29/us/bianca-devins-murder-new-york/index.html [https://perma.cc/88E7-CJCQ]. 
6. Melissa Eddy et al., Assailant Live-Streamed Attempt Attack on German Synagogue, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/world/europe/ger 
many-shooting-halle-synagogue.html [https://perma.cc/Q3R5-QEZE]. 
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43 2020 Automation in Moderation 
ever seen or distributed.7  This Article outlines recent efforts to compel or 
encourage platforms to engage in automated, ex ante monitoring, filtering, 
and blocking of online content across a variety of contexts— defamation, 
copyright infringement, and terrorist speech. Proponents of these initia-
tives suggest that ex ante screening requirements will incentivize platforms 
to promote healthier online discourse.  Supporters have also suggested that 
new efforts to regulate platforms’ “content moderation” practices limit Big 
Tech’s power by requiring platforms to bear an appropriate amount of 
responsibility.8 
But this new breed of regulation comes with unappreciated costs for 
civil liberties and unexpected boons for platform power.9  The new auto-
mation techniques exacerbate existing risks to free speech and user pri-
vacy, and create new sources of information that can be exploited for 
surveillance, raising concerns about free association, religious freedoms, 
and racial profiling.  Moreover, the automation process worsens trans-
parency and accountability deficits.  Far from curtailing private power, the 
new regulations expand platform authority to include policing online 
speech, with little oversight and few countervailing checks.  This embrace 
of automation in moderation displays unwarranted optimism about tech-
nology’s ability to solve what is fundamentally a social and political 
problem. 
Technology platforms’ role as “central players” in governing online 
speech and surveillance has been the subject of rich and growing scholarly 
literature.10  In comparison, the role of automation in this context has 
7. But automated systems currently in place do not always work and platforms 
often depend on users and third parties to report harmful content. These calls are not 
limited to ordinary posts by individual users.  In spring 2019, Facebook pulled Donald 
Trump’s campaign ads after their automated system failed to detect that the ads violated 
the platform’s guidelines by explicitly targeting voters based on gender. Owen Daugh-
erty, Facebook Pulls Trump Campaign Ad Violating Platform’s Policy, HILL (Aug. 20, 2019, 
2:12 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/458116-facebook-pulls-trump-cam 
paign-ad-violating-platforms-policy [https://perma.cc/L6HR-J2ER]; Judd Legum, 
Facebook Admits Trump Campaign Is Violating Its Rules, Takes Down Numerous Ads 
Targeting Women, POPULAR  INFO. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://popular.info/p/facebook-
admits-trump-campaign-is [https://perma.cc/HC2G-85LR]. 
8. See, e.g., Kevin Madigan, Will the EU Finally Hold Internet Giants Accountable?, 
CPIP (July 3, 2018), https://cpip.gmu.edu/2018/07/03/will-the-eu-finally-hold-internet-
giants-accountable/ [https://perma.cc/SJ9Y-LTXF] (describing online platforms as “the 
most powerful and wealthy entities in the world”); Europe Takes an Important Step Toward 
Platform Accountability with Directive on Copyright, AAP (Sept. 13, 2018), https://news-
room.publishers.org/europe-takes-an-important-step-toward-platform-accountability-
with-directive-on-copyright/ [https://perma.cc/EW35-TNPF]. See also Press Release, 
U.S. Senator Josh Hawley, Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend Section 230 
Immunity for Big Tech Companies (June 19, 2019) (available at https://www.hawley. 
senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduces-legislation-amend-section-230-immunity-big-tech-
companies [https://perma.cc/FMM5-9PSJ]). 
9. This analysis is necessarily preliminary, both because the regulatory landscape 
has shifted dramatically in the last year, and because technological change is underway. 
See infra Part II (discussing recent regulatory developments). 
10. See generally, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CON-
STRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (Oxford Univ. Press 2019); Jack Balkin, Essay, 
Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011 (2018) [hereinafter Free Speech Is a 
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received scant scholarly attention.  This article aims to fill that gap by 
exploring the utility of automation,11 and how its use in law enforcement 
may lead to cooptation by powerful actors.12  Automation affords a new 
and attractive menu of options for private stakeholders, law enforcement, 
and intelligence agencies.13  Automation in content moderation is part of a 
much broader push for private industry to develop swifter, more accurate, 
and more effective technologies to aid law enforcement. 
Private companies, not state actors, largely control the infrastructure 
of free speech today.14  The largely hands-off approach to regulating online 
intermediaries has also allowed them to develop extraordinary expertise 
regarding controlling the delivery of online content— harvesting, compiling, 
and profiting off of vast amounts of user data in the process. Today, the 
Triangle]; Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807 (2012); Danielle Keats 
Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1035 (2018) [hereinafter Extremist Speech]; Jennifer Daskal, Speech Across Borders, 
105 VA. L. REV. 1605 (2019); Kristen E. Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands, 167 U. PA. L. 
REV. 665 (2019); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Gov-
erning Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018); Molly K. Land, Against Privatized 
Censorship: Proposals for Responsible Delegation, 60 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming July 
2020); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353 (2018); 
Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency 
in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105 (2010); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveil-
lance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99 (2018). See also TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODI-
ANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT 
SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 177 (Yale Univ. Press 2018); SARAH T. ROBERTS, BEHIND THE SCREEN: 
CONTENT MODERATION IN THE SHADOWS OF SOCIAL MEDIA 33 (Yale Univ. Press 2019). 
11. Except for algorithmic copyright enforcement, which has been the subject of sus-
tained examination, automation in moderation has largely escaped scrutiny. See gener-
ally Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 695 (2011) [hereinafter Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?]; Lital 
Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Standard, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1194 (2011); Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copy-
right Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473 (2016). Many scholars are considering the 
automation of decision-making in other adjudicatory settings. See Danielle Keats Citron, 
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1254 (2008) [hereinafter Technolog-
ical Due Process]; Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative 
Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1152 (2017); Cary 
Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 
1 (2019) [hereinafter Transparency and Algorithmic Governance]. See, e.g., Kiel Brennan-
Marquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Artificial Intelligence and Role-Reversible Judgment, 
109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 137 (2019); Rebecca Crootof, “Cyborg Justice” and 
the Risk of Technological-Legal Lock-In, 119 COLUM. L. REV. F. 233, 233 (2019); Sandra G. 
Mayson, Bias in, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2218 (2019); Frank Pasquale, A Rule of 
Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2019); Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1135 (2019). 
12. See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
2296, 2324– 29 (2014) [hereinafter Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation]. 
13. See SHOSHANA  ZUBOFF, THE  AGE OF  SURVEILLANCE  CAPITALISM: THE  FIGHT FOR A 
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (Pub. Affairs 1st ed. 2019). 
14. The prevalence of private ownership has shifted the legal landscape from a dual-
ist system in which states regulate speakers directly, to a pluralist model in which the 
Internet infrastructure serves as a critical intermediary between states and speakers. 
Free Speech Is a Triangle, supra note 10, at 2021.  See also Klonick, supra note 10, at 
1617. 
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private sector’s capacity to structure, censor, and control the flow of infor-
mation far outstrips that of the government. 
This reality has given rise to a new regulatory approach. Under the 
new breed of regulation— typified by initiatives like the European Union’s 
Copyright Directive, Germany’s Network Enforcement Act of 2018, and 
Australia’s Abhorrent Violent Material (AVM) statute— platforms must take 
down unlawful content faster, sometimes within twenty-four hours.15  Yet, 
the state does not directly require online platforms to adopt specific meth-
ods or techniques to achieve this goal, nor to directly control the outcomes 
of content moderation decisions.  Rather, this new approach imposes 
demanding obligations on platforms while at the same time yielding to 
them substantial discretion and enforcement authority, leaving it to the pri-
vate sector to determine how to comply.16 
This approach might seem like an appropriate middle ground between 
command-and-control regulation on the one hand, and self-regulation on 
the other.  Indeed, what might variously be called co-regulation, collabora-
tive governance, or multi-stakeholder governance is an increasingly popu-
lar framework for governing the technology sector in multiple contexts far 
beyond content regulation.17 
In the context of automated content regulation, however, this approach 
has several major drawbacks.  First, in the absence of clear obligations, 
platforms will tend to over-censor and over-block. Both, state actors and 
the private sector, have acknowledged that automated content moderation 
is both over- and under-inclusive.18  Automation also creates new sources 
of information that will be valuable to both, private and public sector 
actors, and opens the door for further “relational” surveillance of users and 
their broader networks.19 
Second, this regulatory paradigm extends law enforcement’s influence 
to the design, process, and substance of automated content moderation. 
Politics already affect the design and the implementation of content moder-
ation rules like the types of user-generated content that platforms opt to 
control and the ways in which platforms police that content.20 Though pri-
15. See discussion infra Part II. 
16. Id. 
17. See Robert Gorwa et al., Algorithmic Content Moderation: Technical and Political 
Challenges in the Automation of Platform Governance, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.– June 2020, 
at 1, 1– 2 (describing a movement toward co-regulation and transnational standards); 
Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic 
Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1533 (describing how algorithmic accountability 
requires both collaborative governance and an individual rights regime). 
18. See Gorwa et al., supra note 17, at 7– 10. 
19. Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First 
Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 751 (2008). 
20. See, e.g., Joseph Cox & Jason Koebler, Why Won’t Twitter Treat White Supremacy 
Like ISIS? Because It Would Mean Banning Some Republican Politicians Too, VICE (Apr. 25, 
2019, 12:21 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/a3xgq5/why-wont-twit 
ter-treat-white-supremacy-like-isis-because-it-would-mean-banning-some-republican-poli 
ticians-too [https://perma.cc/J3AP-HXKH]; Casey Newton, Why Twitter Has Been Slow to 
Ban White Nationalists, VERGE (Apr. 26, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/ 
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vately developed and implemented, these frameworks are neither apolitical 
nor neutral.21  Rather, content moderation rules— and the technologies that 
apply them— reflect corporate, social, and legal values.22  Platforms adapt 
their content moderation rules and practices to conform to regulators’ pref-
erences, both to comply and to avoid new regulations. 
Perhaps the most significant danger of this approach is that, by design-
ing new technologies of content moderation, platforms will create irresisti-
ble tools for law enforcement.  Public-private cooperation is at the core of 
ongoing efforts to fight cybercrime, and investigative methodologies are 
increasingly rooted in proprietary technology.23  Although opponents of 
“Big Tech” often describe automation-in-moderation requirements as a 
method of checking platform power, many of these new initiatives are more 
likely to entrench the power of online platforms by making them indispen-
sable to government regulators.  In their current form, regulations that 
demand that platforms build and deploy proactive monitoring and filtering 
mechanisms, risk aggrandizing the corporate power they ostensibly seek to 
limit— they entrust the private sector to design its own compliance tools.24 
Moreover, preserving the centralization and dominance of large technology 




21. See Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, supra note 12, at 2298 (“Because 
there are so many speakers, who are often anonymous, difficult to co-opt, or otherwise 
beyond the government’s effective control, the state aims at Internet intermediaries and 
other owners of digital infrastructure . . . .”); Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform 
Governance: Private Power in the Shadow of the State, 72 SMU L. REV. 27, 27 (2019); 
Technological Due Process, supra note 11, at 1037. 
22. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CON-
TROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 61 (Harvard Univ. Press 2015) (“Despite their claims of 
objectivity and neutrality, they are constantly making value-laden, controversial deci-
sions.”). See also Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3, 5 (forthcoming 2020); Klonick, supra note 10, at 1616 (citing 
other scholars in support of the argument that Facebook’s legal culture is distinctively 
imbued with American free speech thinking); Harry Surden, Values Embedded in Legal 
Artificial Intelligence 1 (Univ. of Colo. Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 17-17, 
2017) (“Technological systems can have values embedded in their design.”). See also 
Bruno Latour, Technology Is Society Made Durable, 38 SOC. REV. 103, 130 (1990); Ari 
Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 
(2019) (“[A]lgorithmic decision-making hides the fact that engineers and their corporate 
employers are choosing winners and losers while steadfastly remaining agnostic about 
the social, political, and economic consequences of their work.”). 
23. ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, 
AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 129– 30 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2017). 
24. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 122. (“As network intermediaries have resisted 
efforts to write the logic of the exception into law, they have become masters at both 
public relations and inside-the-Beltway political positioning.  The result is a legal and 
media landscape characterized by complex power struggles among the dominant inter-
ests.  In those struggles, platforms do not simply play defense. Rather, they have worked 
to position themselves as both essential partners and competing sovereigns in the quest 
to instantiate states of exception algorithmically.”). 
25. Tyler Cowen, Breaking Up Facebook Would Be a Big Mistake, SLATE (June 13, 2019, 
7:30 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/06/facebook-big-tech-antitrust-breakup-
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This new breed of content regulation is worthy of its own analysis 
because it illustrates the “embeddedness” of platforms in politics and the 
ease with which states can influence ostensibly private regulation in order 
to censor and surveil.26  Seen through this lens, the turn toward automa-
tion is neither a check on the power of technology companies nor a guaran-
tee that they will act more effectively or more neutrally. Rather, the 
increasing reliance on automation will heighten the risk that both, plat-
forms and governments, will experience cooptation and capture.27 
Over-reliance on the private development of new technologies of mod-
eration is thus poor public policy on at least two levels. The turn toward 
automation poses straightforward, significant risks to user speech and pri-
vacy, and fails to encompass meaningful checks against those risks.  But in 
a more political sense, the new regulations disguise themselves as account-
ability measures while providing the private sector with a source of power 
and profit and entrenching frameworks through which they are likely to be 
coopted. 
The remainder of the discussion proceeds in four parts.  Part I 
describes how the framework of intermediary immunity permitted large 
online platforms to experiment with automated moderation technologies, 
and traces how this experimentation came to characterize modern online 
platforms.  Part II maps several recent legal developments that urge plat-
forms to adopt automated and proactive filtering and monitoring tech-
niques in sectors as far-flung as copyright enforcement, defamation, and 
violent content.  In Part III, the Article explores the normative conse-
quences of these developments, considering how they might aggravate 
existing tendencies toward censorship and surveillance, encode bias and 
harmful stereotypes, and aggrandize corporate power. Part IV offers an 
agenda for moderating the use of automation. Rigorous notice require-
ments, transparency rules, and independent oversight bodies— elements 
mistake.html [https://perma.cc/L8GH-CFBL] (“We’re probably better off having major, 
well-capitalized companies as guardians and gatekeepers of online channels, however 
imperfect their records, as the relevant alternatives would probably be less able to fend 
off abuse of their platforms and thus we would all fare worse.”). See also Jon Bateman, 
The Antitrust Threat to National Security, WALL  STREET J. (Oct. 22, 2019, 6:43 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-antitrust-threat-to-national-security-11571784197 
[https://perma.cc/CK7S-8J3Q]; Cory Doctorow, Regulating Big Tech Makes Them 
Stronger, so They Need Competition Instead, ECONOMIST (June 6, 2019), http://www.econ 
omist.com/open-future/2019/06/06/regulating-big-tech-makes-them-stronger-so-they-
need-competition-instead [https://perma.cc/E6KY-6J9H]. 
26. Sarah T. Roberts, Digital Detritus: ‘Error’ and the Logic of Opacity in Social Media 
Content Moderation, FIRST  MONDAY (Mar. 2018), https://www.firstmonday.org/ojs/ 
index.php/fm/article/view/8283 [https://perma.cc/79XP-2EQC] (describing “the plat-
forms’ own ‘embeddedness’ with the U.S. political establishment, and their own relation-
ship to policy, foreign and domestic.”); Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, supra 
note 12, at 2325 (“[T]he government offers a combination of carrots and sticks, the 
most important being legal immunity for assisting the government in identifying or 
shutting down Internet sites and speakers that the government disfavors or seeks to 
regulate.”). 
27. Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, supra note 12, at 2325– 26. 
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notably lacking from the current initiatives— might promote accountability 
for both, platforms and state actors. 
I. The Origins of Automation in Moderation 
As James Grimmelmann defines it, moderation is “the governance 
mechanisms that structure participation in a community to facilitate coop-
eration and prevent abuse.”28  By “content moderation,” I mean a plat-
form’s internal decision-making on whether user-generated content 
violates its rules, and if so, what the penalty might be.29  By enforcing what 
Sarah Roberts calls the “rules of engagement in online social spaces,” con-
tent moderators attempt to delineate between acceptable and unacceptable 
conduct as the platform defines it.30 
These functions are inextricably linked to the formation and govern-
ance of online communities, but moderation also mitigates the risk that 
unwanted content might alienate users and reduce platform profits. 
Increasingly, moderation rules also address the risk that political actors 
might regulate platforms in ways that would diminish the power of said 
platforms.31  “Moderation,” thus, has two functions: to constitute rules and 
procedures for a community, and to limit the “intensity or extremeness” of 
its substance.32  By defining the boundaries of participation in a commu-
nity and imposing sanctions on those who violate the conditions of that 
membership, moderation rules are at the core of online communities’ abil-
ity to regulate themselves and shape the conditions for free expression.33 
This Part begins by explaining how and why intermediary liability 
laws in the United States (U.S.) and in Europe have historically granted 
broad deference to platforms’ rules and mechanisms for governing user 
speech.  As a result of this deference, platforms were able to develop rules 
and technologies for blocking, filtering, and monitoring user speech on a 
voluntary basis. 
A. Immunity, Safe Harbor & Private Governance 
Because both the U.S. and Europe have observed protections against 
intermediary liability that formally deferred to self-regulation by online 
actors, the private governance of online speech is of particular impor-
28. James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42, 47 
(2015) [hereinafter The Virtues of Moderation] (emphasis omitted). 
29. ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 1. 
30. Id. at 33– 35. 
31. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, The Platform Is the Message, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 
217, 217 (2018) [hereinafter The Platform Is the Message]; Klonick, supra note 10, at 
1667– 68. See also JULIAN DIBBELL, MY TINY LIFE: CRIME AND PASSION IN A VIRTUAL WORLD 
20 (Henry Holt & Co. 1st ed. 1998) (considering the “death penalty”). 
32. Moderate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
moderation [https://perma.cc/L9RF-XZWS] (last visited June 23, 2020) (“1: to lessen 
the intensity or extremeness of; 2: to preside over or act as chairman of . . . .”). 
33. The Virtues of Moderation, supra note 28, at 48– 50; The Platform Is the Message, 
supra note 31, at 224. 
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tance.34  Intermediary protections found their strongest expression in Sec-
tion 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), which states: 
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as 
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another informa-
tion content provider.”35  In the CDA’s “Good Samaritan” provision, Con-
gress also enacted protections for providers who took action “in good faith” 
to restrict “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing 
or otherwise objectionable” content.36  Under Section 230, information 
service providers are immune from liability both for hosting content that 
they know to be unlawful, and for removing content that they know to be 
constitutionally protected.37 
Few other intermediary protections contain language quite as broad as 
Section 230.  Compared with Section 230’s broad immunity, “safe harbors” 
are a more common— and perhaps more justified— statutory approach, 
offering a conditional defense against liability.38  Under Section 512 of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, hosting providers are generally 
not liable for instances of copyright infringement by users so long as they 
do not know of the infringing material or activity.39  In the European 
Union (EU), the E-Commerce Directive similarly shields service providers 
from liability for hosting users’ illegal content so long as the providers do 
not have knowledge, authority, or control over the content.40  Under both 
of these “safe harbor” provisions, online service providers are required to 
implement “notice-and-takedown” procedures to “expeditiously remove or 
disable access to” content alleged to be illegal.41 
The decision to insulate platforms from liability for hosting user-gen-
erated speech reflects several political inclinations.  First, it communicates 
34. See Klonick, supra note 10, at 1602. 
35. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
36. Id. § 230(c)(2). 
37. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997); Hassell v. Bird, 
420 P.3d 776, 793 (Cal. 2018) (holding that Section 230 immunity shielded Yelp from a 
court order directing it to take down defamatory consumer reviews); Danielle Keats Cit-
ron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 
Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 408 (2017) (“Platforms have been protected from 
liability even though they republished content knowing it might violate the law, 
encouraged users to post illegal content, changed their design and policies for the pur-
pose of enabling illegal activity, or sold dangerous products.”). The breadth of Section 
230’s protections is not unlimited, however.  Service providers have no immunity for 
violations of intellectual property law, federal criminal law, sex trafficking law, or the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2012). 
38. James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 946 n.371 (2014) 
(arguing that the safe harbor of Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 
1998 is “a better model” for search engine liability than Section 230 of the CDA under 
certain circumstances). 
39. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1) (1998). 
40. Council Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Elec-
tronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), art. 14, 
2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13 [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive 2000/31]. 
41. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).  See also E-Commerce Directive 2000/31, supra note 40, at 
art. 14 (containing nearly identical language). 
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a set of normative assumptions about the valuable role of private ordering 
in governing online speech.42  Second, it relies upon a logic of stimulating 
innovation in order to expand the areas within which platforms were free 
to operate without government oversight.43  Third, although this decision 
functionally created the space for platforms to self-govern, the primarily 
libertarian orientation towards Internet regulation— particularly in the 
U.S.— meant that the potential effects of corporate power and dominance 
were largely overlooked in favor of a focus on government censorship and 
surveillance.44 
Likewise, many early advocates of Internet freedom recognized— and 
celebrated— the politics of online self-regulation, emphasizing the way in 
which the Internet would afford new autonomy to speakers and listeners 
without the existing constraints of government censorship.45  The forma-
tion of online communities had radical democratic roots. Thinkers such as 
John Perry Barlow emphasized how the Internet infrastructure could invert 
the political economy of the telecommunications, media, and entertain-
ment industries, describing the relationship between the production and 
consumption of information as being “as asymmetrical as that of bomber 
to bombee [sic].”46  By creating spaces in which users created, curated, 
edited, and responded to content, the Internet could wrest control of that 
economy away from the media and entertainment industries.47 
This vision of Internet freedom was often described as anarchic or 
“cyber libertarian.”48  It is perhaps more accurately described as “popu-
42. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21, at 38 (describing how intermediary protections 
reflect a neoliberal approach to regulation). 
43. See Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of ‘Platforms’, 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 347, 356 
(2010) (describing platforms’ interest in “fostering a regulatory paradigm that gives 
them the most leeway to conduct their business . . . .”); Klonick, supra note 10, at 
1607– 08. 
44. See ZUBOFF, supra note 13, at 104 (describing “a few consistent themes: that 
technology companies such as Google move faster than the state’s ability to understand 
or follow, that any attempts to intervene or constrain are therefore fated to be ill-con-
ceived and stupid, that regulation is always a negative force that impedes innovation and 
progress, and that lawlessness is the necessary context for ‘technological innovation.’”). 
Cf. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 40 (Princeton Univ. Press 2017) (“Should 
we not subject these forms of government to at least as much critical scrutiny as we pay 
to the democratic state?”); Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and Political 
Law: A Taxonomy of Power, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 37 (2014). 
45. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, EFF (Feb. 8, 
1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https://perma.cc/W5YL-4QDP] 
[hereinafter A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace]. 
46. John Perry Barlow, Death from Above, COMM. ACM, May 1995, at 17, 17. 
47. See John Perry Barlow, Property and Speech: Who Owns What You Say in Cyber-
space?, COMM. ACM, Dec. 1995, at 19, 20 (criticizing, in bombastic terms, the 1995 
“White Paper,” for extending copyright protection and contracting fair use, to the benefit 
of “media megacorps”). See also Michael Hauben & Ronda Hauben, The Social Forces 
Behind the Development of Usenet, FIRST  MONDAY, July 1998, https://firstmonday.org/ 
ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/609/530 [https://perma.cc/C6MA-2Z77] (“The audi-
ence has very little choice over what is emphasized by most mass media. Usenet, how-
ever, is controlled by its audience.”). 
48. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1203– 04 
(1998). 
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list,” however, in the sense that it donned the mantle of popular support 
and vigorous opposition to elite interests.49  Indeed, despite what Barlow 
called the “natural anarchy” of the Internet, he also acknowledged its dis-
tinctive forms of social order.50  What he called the “unwritten codes” of 
online participation— the largely informal norms, rules, and policies that 
governed online services— were, in this telling, the expression of demo-
cratic self-governance, not instruments of censorship.51 
Today, major platforms like Google, Facebook, and Twitter make rules 
that indelibly affect what, how, and where users are able to speak.52  Plat-
forms’ moderation rules affect public discourse; information flow; and 
individual, free expression rights.  Legal scholars who analyze these issues 
from the perspective of free expression often see the substantive rules of 
content moderation as performing an important, law-like function, setting 
the boundaries of participation in an online community and the penalties 
for non-compliance with those rules.53 
That intermediary immunities that have created breathing room for 
platforms to create their own, voluntary, quasi-regulatory speech con-
straints may seem ironic in light of the freewheeling libertarianism of early 
Internet freedom advocates.  But the proliferation of monitoring, filtering, 
and moderation technologies is the direct result of intermediary immuni-
ties and safe harbors created to stimulate innovation.54  As Annemarie 
Bridy pointed out, Section 230’s model of intermediary immunity both 
allows platforms to take down speech that public actors could not censor, 
and “frees them to develop and experiment with new tools for doing so, 
including automated technical measures.”55 
49. See, e.g., Margaret Canovan, Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of 
Democracy, 47 POL. STUD. 2, 4 (1999) (“Populists claim legitimacy on the grounds that 
they speak for the people: that is to say, they claim to represent the democratic sovereign, 
not a sectional interest such as an economic class.”); Cas Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist, 
39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 541, 541, 544 (2004). 
50. See John Perry Barlow, The Great Work, COMM. ACM, Jan. 1992, at 25, 25– 26. 
51. A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, supra note 45. 
52. See Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering in the 
Age of Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2259, 2260 (2014); Chander, supra note 10, 
at 1809, 1816; Klonick, supra note 10, at 1616– 17; Sarah Myers West, Censored, Sus-
pended, Shadowbanned: User Interpretations of Content Moderation on Social Media Plat-
forms, 20 NEW  MEDIA & SOC’Y 4366, 4366 (2018) [hereinafter Censored, Suspended, 
Shadowbanned]. 
53. Klonick, supra note 10, at 1630; Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 
33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 602 (2016). 
54. Kate Klonick, Why the History of Content Moderation Matters, TECHDIRT (Jan. 30, 
2018, 11:55 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180129/21074939116/why-
history-content-moderation-matters.shtml [https://perma.cc/E7G2-UQ4V] (“[M]ore 
important than understanding the intricacies of the system is understanding the history 
of how it was developed.”). 
55. Annemarie Bridy, Leveraging CDA 230 to Counter Online Extremism, GEO. WASH. 
PROGRAM ON  EXTREMISM (Sept. 2019), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/ 
zaxdzs2191/f/Leveraging%20230%20to%20Counter%20Online%20Extremism.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8SKA-KHNW]. 
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B. Spam Filtering 
Made immune from legal responsibility for user-generated content, 
web platforms could have become a free-for-all.56  But the “superabundant 
resources” of the web were not inexhaustible.57  The burgeoning number of 
web users put stress on some of the early web services.58  Trolling,59 
spam,60 manipulation,61 and other kinds of misbehavior grew common. 
These kinds of misbehavior had the potential to damage online communi-
ties and drained resources.  Online communities reacted by developing 
their own rules and restrictions to both, constrain online misbehavior, and 
promote desirable behavior. 
At least in theory, early Internet platforms lent themselves to forms of 
moderation from the bottom up. For instance, Usenet newsgroups,— an 
archetypal example of the dynamics of early cyberspace— were decentral-
ized and could either be moderated or unmoderated.62  But whether mod-
erated or not, Usenet was celebrated for its “uncensored” nature precisely 
because it was cooperative and “controlled by its audience” rather than a 
central authority.63  For Usenet, the power to moderate content went hand 
in hand with the power to constitute a “community of interest.” In other 
words, the power to engage in the explicitly political act of defining the 
limits of acceptable behavior in a social group.64 
Usenet’s experience with spam shows exactly how, despite its decen-
tralization, the grassroots approach to online moderation in fact embraced 
order over chaos.  In 1994, two lawyers, Laurence Canter and Marsha 
56. Klonick, supra note 10, at 1604. 
57. MILTON L. MUELLER, NETWORKS AND  STATES: THE  GLOBAL  POLITICS OF  INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE 2 (MIT Press 3d ed. 2010). 
58. Ed Krol, It’s Time to Give Usenet a Much-Needed Overhaul, NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 
1, 1996, at 65 (describing how, as Usenet grew, discussion groups got “too active” to be 
sustainable). 
59. Mattathias Schwartz, The Trolls Among Us, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2008), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/08/03/magazine/03trolls-t.html [https://perma.cc/2M4C-
GP2R]. 
60. FINN BRUNTON, SPAM: A SHADOW HISTORY OF THE INTERNET xvi (MIT Press 2013) 
(describing how spammers work “often by directly exploiting the same technologies and 
beneficial effects that enable the communities on which they predate”). 
61. Sara Kiesler et al., Regulating Behavior in Online Communities, in BUILDING SUC-
CESSFUL ONLINE COMMUNITIES: EVIDENCE-BASED SOCIAL DESIGN 125, 128 (Robert E. Kraut 
& Paul Resnick eds., MIT Press 2011). 
62. See, e.g.,  Jeffrey M. Taylor, Liability of Usenet Moderators for Defamation Pub-
lished by Others: Flinging the Law of Defamation into Cyberspace, 47 FLA. L. REV. 247, 254 
(1995). See also Martin Dodge & Rob Kitchin, MAPPING CYBERSPACE 135 (Routledge 1st 
ed. 2001) (“Usenet can be thought of as the archetype of uncontrolled cyberspace, since 
it is highly distributed, free-wheeling, and has no official funding, external quality con-
trol or censorship.”). 
63. See Hauben & Hauben, supra note 47. See also JANET  ABBATE, INVENTING THE 
INTERNET 203 (MIT Press 1999) (describing how commercial providers began to “imi-
tate” grassroots systems like Usenet through proprietary protocols). 
64. See ABBATE, supra note 63, at 201. See also Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, 
Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 
YALE L.J. 1639, 1656– 58 (1995) (describing how “netizens” have chosen to use modera-
tion through voting). 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\53-1\CIN102.txt unknown Seq: 13  8-DEC-20 17:23
 
 
53 2020 Automation in Moderation 
Siegel, sent mass messages to Usenet newsgroups with the subject line 
“Green Card Lottery - Final One?” touting their own legal services— a mas-
sive violation of Usenet norms against unsolicited email.65  The reaction 
was hostile, to say the least. Recipients sent “ ‘electronic letter bombs’ 
designed to destroy” the ads,66 and created an electronic beeper which 
called the Canter & Siegel law offices repeatedly during the night, filling 
their voicemail boxes.67 
The Canter & Siegel incident became an infamous turning point for 
online communications.  Canter has been called “the father of modern 
spam,”68 and the Green Card Lottery spam message is widely described as 
the  “public debut” of unsolicited commercial advertising on Usenet.69  But 
rather than being the death of grassroots moderation, the Canter & Siegel 
advertisement showed the flexibility and adaptability of the Usenet com-
munity.  In part, Usenet users responded to the Canter & Siegel advertise-
ment by organizing the community to implement ex ante screening 
protocols to identify and flag, or delete, suspected spam.70 
Canter and Siegel also showed the power and breadth of online com-
mercial advertising at the very moment that commercialization and priva-
tization of the Internet began to pick up speed.71  While the Internet’s 
backbone had been formally transferred from military to civilian control in 
1990, the National Science Foundation continued to run the backbone, 
which specifically prohibited commercial activities.72  Throughout the 
early and mid-1990s, however, new commercial network service providers 
emerged, creating a new commercial infrastructure for the Internet that 
ultimately replaced the old government-run backbone.73  In a 2002 inter-
view, Canter reported that the Green Card Lottery incident had caused sev-
eral service providers to terminate the Canter & Siegel account because 
their servers lacked the capacity for the “huge amounts of traffic” that the 
advertisement generated.74 
As commercial infrastructure improved, and commercial email service 
providers emerged, spam remained a universal annoyance. As a result, the 
65. Branscomb, supra note 64, at 1656– 58; Lorrie Faith Cranor & Brian A. 
LaMacchia, Spam!, COMM. ACM, Aug. 1998, at 74, 75. 
66. See Branscomb, supra note 64, at 1658. 
67. Id. at 1658 n.70. 
68. The Father of Modern Spam Speaks, CNET (Mar. 26, 2002, 12:19 PM), https:// 
www.cnet.com/news/the-father-of-modern-spam-speaks/ [https://perma.cc/WM7Z-
QZJV]. 
69. Cranor & LaMacchia, supra note 65, at 74. See also Brian Hayes, Computing 
Science: Spam, Spam, Spam, Lovely Spam, 91 AM. SCIENTIST 200, 200– 01 (2003). 
70. See Hayes, supra note 69, at 200– 01. See also BRUNTON, supra note 60, at 96 
(describing the formation of the news.admin.net-abuse.email newsgroup, or NANAE, to 
respond to spam). 
71. See The Father of Modern Spam Speaks, supra note 68 (“What we definitely 
showed was that you could reach a lot of people— huge numbers of people! Today it 
would be the equivalent to reaching millions relatively easily.”). 
72. ABBATE, supra note 63, at 196 (explaining that “Congress was quick to condemn 
any use of government-subsidized resources for commercial purposes”). 
73. See id. at 197– 99. 
74. The Father of Modern Spam Speaks, supra note 68. 
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technology of spam filtering developed rapidly.75  In August 2002, Paul 
Graham published A Plan for Spam, an essay that endorsed the use of 
näıve, Bayesian, statistical analysis for spam filtering.76  Graham’s 
approach relied on a statistical analysis of tokens in two corpus— one of 
spam, and one of non-spam— to determine the probability that a given mes-
sage was spam.77  Graham’s statistical analysis laid the groundwork for 
spam filtering technology that could adapt quickly over time as spammers 
deployed new language to circumvent filters.78 
Although governments also acted, the private sector proved more effec-
tive at enforcing anti-spam measures.  When Congress enacted the CAN-
SPAM Act in 2003, it regulated the structure of spam messages and certain 
methods used to send them.79  At the end of the day, though, CAN-SPAM 
proved difficult to enforce.80  Code-based spam filters, however, have dra-
matically improved the experience of email users.81  Technology compa-
nies have invested heavily in filtering technologies for spam, which 
accounted for over 90% of all email by 2009.82  Platforms have also 
extended spam filtering techniques to other categories of bad content 
online.83 
1. “Artificial Intelligence” 
Usenet’s response to Canter & Siegel demonstrated the power of social 
norms as a moderating influence.84  But as platforms grew, expanded, and 
commercialized, social norms provided less cohesion.85  Graham’s innova-
tion illustrated how the social and legal norms of online content modera-
75. BRUNTON, supra note 60, at 126– 28 (describing spam research). 
76. A Plan for Spam, PAUL  GRAHAM (Aug. 2002), http://www.paulgraham.com/ 
spam.html [https://perma.cc/6VB8-4PSP] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020) [hereinafter GRA-
HAM].  See also BRUNTON, supra note 60, at 133– 35. 
77. GRAHAM, supra note 76. 
78. BRUNTON, supra note 60, at 140– 41. 
79. Roger Allan Ford, Preemption of State Spam Laws by the Federal CAN-SPAM Act, 
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 355, 358– 60 (2005). 
80. Id. at 356. 
81. Bradley Taylor et al., The War Against Spam: A Report from the Front Line, in NIPS 
2007 WORKSHOP ON  MACHINE  LEARNING  ADVERSARIAL  ENVIRONMENTS FOR  COMPUTER 
SECURITY 1, 1, 3 (2007). 
82. See generally Sarita Yardi et al., Detecting Spam in a Twitter Network, FIRST MON-
DAY, Jan. 2010, https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2793 [https:// 
perma.cc/K4FY-BPZY]. See also Spam (Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail): Hearing Before 
the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 108th Cong. 3 (2003) (opening statement of 
Hon. John McCain, Chairman of the Committee). 
83. See infra Section III.E. 
84. Justin Peters, Original Sin: The Creation of Email Spam and Its Threat to the Prom-
ise of the Internet, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (2013), https://archives.cjr.org/critical_eye/ 
original_sin.php [https://perma.cc/5EKF-HSKZ]. 
85. Caitlin McLaughlin & Jessica Vitak, Norm Evolution and Violation on Facebook, 
14 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 299, 300 (2012) (“Because of the speed at which these sites have 
evolved, however, an established set of social norms guiding users’ behavior has been 
slow to follow.  Furthermore, when behavioral norms are ambiguous, it becomes more 
difficult to both establish a formal set of norms and to respond to perceived norm 
violations.”). 
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tion could be encoded into architecture and design.  The emerging 
availability of filtering protocols and software meant that Usenet-style 
social norms against spam could be formalized into code deployed at the 
platform or provider level without draining platform resources. 
As commercialized platforms developed an increasingly robust set of 
rules and policies to guide participation on the platforms, they embraced 
automated filtering as a critical tool for scaling the application of these 
standards.  This focus on scale is partly responsible for the transformation 
that moderation has undergone from the grassroots of the early Internet 
into the more “industrial” version we see today: moderation techniques 
that rely heavily on both, ex ante, automated screening mechanisms, as 
well as ex post review by human moderators (equally aided by 
machines).86 
Platforms seized the opportunity to use automated, ex ante screening 
to exclude spam from their services, but their different business models 
also meant that definitions of spam, and automated techniques to address 
it, diverged.87  Gmail’s program policies prohibit— but do not define— 
“spam,” and remind users to “keep in mind that [their] definition of ‘unso-
licited’ or ‘unwanted’ mail may differ from [the] email recipients’ percep-
tion.”88  In contrast, Facebook’s community standards prohibit 
“commercial spam,” and explicitly instruct users not to “artificially 
increase distribution for financial gain.”89  YouTube’s community guide-
lines prohibit “spam, scams, and other deceptive practices that take advan-
tage of the YouTube community,” including voter suppression.90  These 
differences not only demonstrate that the very definition of prohibited 
“spam” can vary greatly even between major mainstream communities, but 
also that the technical and quasi-legal architecture of filtering can flexibly 
accommodate different kinds of restrictions. 
Intermediary immunities and safe harbor protections allowed plat-
forms to disclose their content-filtering mechanisms. Even so, companies 
have struggled to ensure that their abuse detection “scales” to meet the 
needs of global communication.91  The problem is that “the more ambigu-
ous and contextual classificatory criteria become, the more difficult it 
86. Robyn Caplan, Content or Context Moderation?: Artisinal, Community-Reliant, and 
Industrial Approaches, DATA & SOC’Y (Nov. 14, 2018), https://datasociety.net/library/ 
content-or-context-moderation/ [https://perma.cc/V74Z-P4AM]. See also Gorwa et al., 
supra note 17, at 7– 10. 
87. Cf. The Virtues of Moderation, supra note 28, at 67– 68 (distinguishing between ex 
ante and ex post). 
88. Gmail Program Policies, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/gmail/about/policy/ 
[https://perma.cc/D8NH-X8AD] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020). 
89. Community Standards: Spam, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/commun 
itystandards/spam [https://perma.cc/E2KM-2QQC] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020). 
90. Spam, Deceptive Practices & Scams Policies, YOUTUBE, https://sup-
port.google.com/youtube/answer/2801973?hl=en [https://perma.cc/L4YJ-4R6H] (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2020). 
91. Taylor et al., supra note 81, at 3 (describing the challenges of internationalizing 
machine learning for spam filters). 
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becomes to train algorithms accurately.”92  Compared to contextual deci-
sions about whether a depiction of violence is a piece of extremist content 
or a human rights report about extremism, spam is relatively easy. For 
example, Bayesian filters would respond as spammers started to use 
“v14gr4” instead of “Viagra.”93 
While platforms often tout the sophistication of their machine learn-
ing methods, these methods often falter in significant ways. Consider Per-
spective API (Perspective), a popular machine learning system developed by 
Google and Jigsaw to help combat trolling and “improve conversations 
online.”94  In 2017, University of Washington researchers demonstrated 
how easily Perspective could be fooled, finding that “an adversary can sub-
tly modify a toxic phrase”— for example, by misspelling the word “idiots” as 
“idiiots,” “id.iots,” or “i.diots”— to significantly lower the “toxicity score” 
and the likelihood that a comment would be classified as “rude” or trol-
ling.95  This year, researchers also demonstrated that Perspective dispro-
portionately identifies posts written in African-American Vernacular 
English as “rude” or “toxic,” reflecting— and amplifying— racial bias.96 
Despite their drawbacks, machine learning and artificial intelligence 
are critical tools for scaling content moderation.  Indeed, stemming the tide 
of bad content became a matter of corporate survival. Spam filtering illus-
trated the potential benefits automation held for both, users and platforms 
seeking to limit certain kinds of online content. Today, platforms employ a 
variety of techniques to make content-related decisions far beyond spam. 
Just as Graham’s Plan for Spam approach prescribed Bayesian analysis to 
help an algorithm predict the likelihood that a given email was spam, mod-
ern automated techniques often use machine learning algorithms to pre-
dict the likelihood that a piece of content violates the platforms’ rules or 
the law.97  Like spam, much of this content, while undesirable, is not ille-
92. Kirsten Gollatz et al., The Turn to Artificial Intelligence in Governing Communica-
tion Online, HIIG 1, 7 (2018), https://www.hiig.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Work 
shop-Report-2018-Turn-to-AI.pdf [https://perma.cc/VUS2-HLAP]. 
93. GRAHAM, supra note 76 (explaining his optimism that Bayesian filters would 
respond as spammers started to use “ ‘c0ck’ instead of ‘cock’”). 
94. See generally PERSPECTIVE, https://www.perspectiveapi.com/#/home [https:// 
perma.cc/2GAY-5X77] (last visited Jan. 31, 2020). 
95. Hossein Hosseini et al., Deceiving Google’s Perspective API Built for Detecting Toxic 
Comments, ARXIV 1, 2 tbl.1 (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.08138.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/TV3A-9CBG]. 
96. Maarten Sap et al., The Risk of Racial Bias in Hate Speech Detection, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE 57TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION OF COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 
1668, 1668– 70, 1677 (ACL 2019); Anna Chung, How Automated Tools Discriminate 
Against Black Language, MEDIUM (Feb. 28, 2019), https://onezero.medium.com/how-
automated-tools-discriminate-against-black-language-2ac8eab8d6db [https://perma.cc/ 
5EZG-TVWP]. See also Thomas Davidson et al., Racial Bias in Hate Speech and Abusive 
Language Detection Datasets, ARXIV 1, 5– 8 (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/ 
1905.12516v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3YG-R7CZ] (demonstrating “substantial racial 
disparities” in the performance of language classifiers intended to detect hate speech 
and abusive language). 
97. See Natasha Duarte et al., Mixed Messages? The Limits of Automated Social Media 
Content Analysis, CTR. DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Nov. 28, 2017), https://cdt.org/insights/ 
mixed-messages-the-limits-of-automated-social-media-content-analysis/ [https:// 
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gal. Platforms use keyword filters to exclude hashtags that promote disor-
dered eating;98 analyze the content of photographs to determine whether 
they include “adult content;”99 and exclude posts that use politically sensi-
tive terms.100 
C. Unlawful Content 
Automated, proactive screening is not limited to legal content that plat-
forms simply find distasteful, too resource-intensive, or would otherwise 
prefer not to host.  Technology companies have also developed tools that 
use fingerprinting and hashing technologies to flag and limit the distribu-
tion of illegal content.  Many of the content-related decisions that platforms 
seek to automate often require more context and judgment than determin-
ing whether an email should go to the recipient’s inbox or junk folder, and 
also have higher stakes. 
Unlike Bayesian filtering or other content-based automated screening 
techniques, which predict the likelihood that a piece of content should be 
taken down, fingerprinting and hashing technologies essentially work by 
screening the characteristics of user-uploaded content against an existing 
database of characteristics that indicate illegality.101  In order to screen 
user-generated content, fingerprinting and hashing technologies require a 
library of content that has already been determined to possess the relevant 
characteristics.102 
Many platforms rely on sophisticated hashing technology to identify 
and prevent the re-upload of specific child sexual abuse images.103  “Hash-
ing” means to apply a mathematical function that generates a series of 
characters to identify a given input.104  For example, one might use a hash 
function to generate a string of characters to identify a photograph, a text 
perma.cc/M8FS-R2XM] (outlining how spam filtering gave rise to different natural lan-
guage processing techniques). 
98. Stevie Chancellor et al., #Thyghgapp: Instagram Content Moderation and Lexical 
Variation in Pro-Eating Disorder Communities, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH ACM CONFER-
ENCE ON  COMPUTER-SUPPORTED  COOPERATIVE  WORK & SOCIAL  COMPUTING 1201 (ACM 
2016); Ysabel Gerrard, Beyond the Hashtag: Circumventing Content Moderation on Social 
Media, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 4492, 4494– 96 (2018). 
99. Shannon Liao, Tumblr Will Ban All Adult Content on December 17th, VERGE (Dec. 
3, 2018, 12:26 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/3/18123752/tumblr-adult-
content-porn-ban-date-explicit-changes-why-safe-mode [https://perma.cc/EKL5-CHUG]. 
100. See generally David Bamman et al., Censorship and Deletion Practices in Chinese 
Social Media, FIRST MONDAY, Mar. 2012, https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/arti-
cle/download/3943/3169 [https://perma.cc/S2TH-773X]. 
101. See generally Gorwa et al., supra note 17. 
102. Id. at 2. 
103. See Jeff Kosseff, Private Computer Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 14 I/S: J.L. 
& POL’Y FOR  INFO. SOC’Y 187, 209 (2018). See, e.g., PhotoDNA, MICROSOFT, https:// 
www.microsoft.com/en-us/photodna [https://perma.cc/J5MV-Y7FU] (last visited June 
21, 2020). 
104. Dennis Martin, Note, Demystifying Hash Searches, 70 STAN. L. REV. 691, 695 
(2018). 
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file, or the contents of a hard drive.105 
PhotoDNA, a tool developed by Microsoft and licensed for free to tech-
nology companies and law enforcement, can match the hash values of 
photos or videos uploaded by individual users against a database of hash 
values of other photos or videos containing illegal images of child sexual 
abuse.106  If PhotoDNA finds a match between user-generated content and 
known child sexual abuse imagery, the software sends a “CyberTip” 
directly to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.107 
Using PhotoDNA, law enforcement can “identify child pornography with 
almost absolute certainty, regardless of the name associated with a file.”108 
Technology companies are not required by law to use proactive moni-
toring or filtering to detect child sexual abuse imagery, but rather have 
done so voluntarily.109  Under the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools 
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), 
companies that obtain “actual knowledge” of child pornography are 
required to report it to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Chil-
dren.110  Despite being shielded from liability, platforms have undertaken 
extensive voluntary action to limit illegal online content, as the PhotoDNA 
example illustrates.  An online service provider might develop these pro-
grams for its own purposes, such as to “protect its own business and repu-
tation and to protect the users” of its systems.111 
Similarly, platforms are also adopting methods of proactive, ex ante 
screening for violent extremist and terrorist content in response to national 
and global pressures.112  In 2016, in response to pressure by European 
governments, several major technology companies formed a consortium, 
the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), and announced 
that they would create a “shared industry database of ‘hashes’— unique dig-
ital ‘fingerprints’— for violent terrorist imagery or terrorist recruitment 
videos or images.”113  The hash database deploys a technology similar to 
that used in countering child sexual abuse imagery: participants in the 
effort build a database of hash values that serve as identifiers for files 
105. Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and the Power of the Hash, 119 
HARV. L. REV. F. 38, 39 (2006) (replying to Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital 
World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005)). 
106. See generally id.; PhotoDNA, supra note 103. 
107. United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636, 637– 38 (5th Cir. 2018). 
108. United States v. Larman, 547 F. App’x 475, 477 (5th Cir. 2013). 
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a)(1) (2008); Susan Klein & Crystal Flinn, Social Media Com-
pliance Programs and the War Against Terrorism, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 53, 78– 79 (2017). 
110. Klein & Flinn, supra note 109, at 78 (citing to PL 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984), 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5773(b) (2015)). 
111. United States v. Green, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1018 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting 
testimony of Don Colcolough, AOL’s Director of Investigations and Cyber Security). See 
also United States v. Keith, 980 F. Supp. 2d 33, 40 (D. Mass. 2013) (finding that AOL 
had “an important business reason” for its Image Detection and Filtering Process, or 
IDFP). 
112. See generally Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21. 
113. Partnering to Help Curb the Spread of Terrorist Content Online, GOOGLE (Dec. 5, 
2016), https://blog.google/topics/google-europe/partnering-help-curb-spread-terrorist-
content-online/ [https://perma.cc/5Z6H-P4Z3]. 
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known to correspond to violent extremist or terrorist content.114 
Though platforms are not required to screen for “terrorist” content, 
they have proudly advertised their abilities to do so.  For instance, 
Facebook expressed support for automated content deletion for terrorist 
content before the European Commission, noting that the platform had 
removed 99% of ISIS and Al-Qaeda terror content before it had been flag-
ged by users.115  YouTube’s most recent report, documenting the enforce-
ment of its Community Guidelines, likewise states that “automated 
flagging enables us to act more quickly and accurately to enforce our 
policies.”116 
Platforms’ proactive initiatives are largely a response to escalating 
threats of regulatory action by the European Commission.117  In the EU, 
the Terrorism Directive explicitly calls for exploring the possibility of “vol-
untary action” by platforms or by state actors to “detect[ ] and flag[ ]” ter-
rorist content online pursuant to platforms’ terms of service.118  The 
European Commission was dissatisfied with platforms’ approach to proac-
tive filtering and followed up with a recommendation on “measures to 
effectively tackle illegal content online.”119  The recommendation exhorted 
platforms to take “proportionate and specific proactive measures, includ-
ing by using automated means,” to find, remove, and prevent the reposting 
of terrorist content.120  Recognizing that the use of automated filtering 
would be difficult for smaller platforms, the Commission also 
“encourage[d]” platforms to “cooperate” in sharing technological tools to 
curb terrorist content.121 
Until spring of 2019, political pressures to address violent extremism 
were largely limited to Islamic terrorism.  That changed, however, after the 
March 2019 shootings at the Masjid al Noor and Linwood Islamic Centre 
in Christchurch, New Zealand prompted a wave of responses from plat-
forms and government actors reconsidering the role of social media in 
114. See Daphne Keller, Internet Platforms: Observations on Speech, Danger, and 
Money 6 (Hoover Inst. Aegis Paper Series No. 1807, 2018) [hereinafter Internet Plat-
forms]; T.J. McIntyre, Child Abuse Images and Cleanfeeds: Assessing Internet Blocking Sys-
tems, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET 277, 288 (Ian Brown ed., 
Edward Elgar 2013). 
115. European Commission Press Release IP/17/5105, Fighting Terrorism Online: 
Internet Forum Pushes for Automatic Detection of Terrorist Propaganda (Dec. 6, 2017) 
(Monika Bickert, Director of Global Policy Management, Facebook, stated that “[t]he use 
of AI and other automation to stop the spread of terrorist content is showing promise.”). 
116. YouTube Community Guidelines Enforcement, GOOGLE, https://transparency 
report.google.com/youtube-policy/removals?hl=en [https://perma.cc/2YWV-5SSH] (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2020). 
117. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21, at 43. 
118. Directive 2017/541, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 
2017 on Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/ 
JHA and Amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, 2017 O.J. (L 88) 6, 9 (EU). 
119. Commission Recommendation of 1 March 2018 on Measures to Effectively Tackle 
Illegal Content Online, at 1, 2, C(2018) 1177 final (Mar. 1, 2018) (EC). 
120. Id. at 8. 
121. Id. 
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amplifying hatred and violence.122  The shooter, who streamed on 
Facebook Live for seventeen minutes as he killed fifty-one people, had 
released a white supremacist manifesto that continued to circulate online 
well after New Zealand banned its possession.123  Facebook, YouTube, and 
Instagram faced questions about why and how restricted footage and 
imagery from the shooting continued to resurface on their platforms.124 
While Facebook had historically banned white supremacist content, it 
did not take steps to eliminate white nationalism and white separatism 
from the platform until after Christchurch.125  YouTube similarly changed 
its policy in June 2019 to prohibit “videos alleging that a group is superior 
in order to justify discrimination, segregation or exclusion based on quali-
ties like age, gender, race, caste, religion, sexual orientation or veteran sta-
tus.”126  Christchurch came in the midst of a string of other mass killings 
linked to white nationalism. In the U.S., mass murderers at the Tree of Life 
Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; the Chabad of Poway, California; 
and the Walmart in El Paso, Texas all posted white nationalist manifestos 
on social media.  The Poway and El Paso shooters explicitly cited Christ-
church as inspiration.127 
Governments and platforms appeared to re-double their efforts to 
address violent extremism after Christchurch.  In May 2019, New Zealand 
and France led a meeting of government actors, technology companies, and 
civil society organizations at which they adopted the Christchurch Call to 
Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online 
(Christchurch Call). The Christchurch Call is a non-binding agreement 
committing the signatories— dozens of nations and major technology com-
panies including Amazon, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter, and You-
Tube— to “work collectively” to “counter violent extremism in all its forms” 
and to “accelerate research into and development of technical solutions to 
prevent the upload of and to detect and immediately remove terrorist and 
122. See Inside the Team at Facebook That Dealt with the Christchurch Shooting, supra 
note 3 (describing how content moderation teams struggled to keep up with the 
footage). 
123. Charles Anderson, Censor Bans ‘Manifesto’ of Christchurch Mosque Shooter, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2019, 10:53 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/ 
24/censor-bans-manifesto-of-christchurch-mosque-shooter [https://perma.cc/94UM-
4TLG]; Charlotte Graham-McLay, Spreading the Mosque Shooting Video Is a Crime in New 
Zealand, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/world/ 
asia/new-zealand-attacks-social-media.html [https://perma.cc/TLP2-8G3S]. 
124. James Rogers, Horrific Footage of Christchurch Mosque Shooting Surfaces on You-
Tube and Instagram, FOX NEWS (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/tech/footage-
christchurch-mosque-shooting-youtube-instagram [https://perma.cc/994Z-JZMP]. 
125. Standing Against Hate, FACEBOOK (Mar. 27, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/ 
2019/03/standing-against-hate/ [https://perma.cc/Y24X-NQJ4]. 
126. Our Ongoing Work to Tackle Hate, YOUTUBE (June 5, 2019), https://you-
tube.googleblog.com/2019/06/our-ongoing-work-to-tackle-hate.html [https://perma.cc/ 
6WZV-Y5GP]. 
127. Tim Arango et al., Minutes Before El Paso Killing, Hate-Filled Manifesto Appears 
Online, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/us/patrick-
crusius-el-paso-shooter-manifesto.html [https://perma.cc/K4TK-B5J9]. 
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violent extremist content online.”128 
At the same time, GIFCT publicly committed to a range of action steps 
to implement the Christchurch Call goals, including investing in AI-based 
and fingerprinting technologies to “detect and remove terrorist and violent 
extremist content.”129  A few months later, GIFCT announced that it would 
become its own independent organization, a step that would allow it to “do 
even more”— but which prompted critics to wonder about the continuing 
influence of dominant platforms.130 
While the threat of regulation is a powerful motivation for platforms to 
synchronize their actions with law enforcement goals, platforms also have 
significant business incentives to voluntarily prevent their services from 
being used to spread horrific illegal content. And in the context of illegal, 
online content, automated flagging has proven to be a powerful opportu-
nity for collaboration and cooperation between the private and public sec-
tors.  In fact, as with many forms of cybercrime, close cooperation between 
the government and private sector is critical for successful prosecution.131 
These concerns have been particularly pronounced because of the 
emergence of “Internet Referral Units (IRUs),” which are specialized police 
units that monitor online activity for terms of service violations and cyber-
crime.132  Several major companies have partnered with these units as 
“trusted flaggers” whose complaints receive expedited treatment.133  IRUs’ 
use of the mechanisms of private governance for law enforcement purposes 
has raised concerns about the transparency, accountability, and redress 
mechanisms for censorship.134 
128. Christchurch Call to Eliminate Terrorist & Violent Extrimist Content Online, 
CHRISTCHURCH  CALL (2019), https://www.christchurchcall.com/christchurch-call.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4DVS-RZPJ]. 
129. Actions to Address the Abuse of Technology to Spread Terrorist and Violent Extrem-
ist Content, GIFCT (May 15, 2019), https://gifct.org/press/actions-address-abuse-tech-
nology-spread-terrorist-and-violent-extremist-content/ [https://perma.cc/TB7T-W874];
Ángel Dı́az, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism’s ‘Transparency Report’ Raises 
More Questions Than Answers, JUST SEC. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 
66298/gifct-transparency-report-raises-more-questions-than-answers/ [https://perma 
.cc/BH5S-EVYJ]; Andrew Sullivan, Looking the GIFCT in the Mouth, INTERNET SOC’Y (Oct. 
11, 2019), https://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2019/10/looking-the-gifct-in-the-
mouth/ [https://perma.cc/NT9B-UBAU]. See also Emma Llansó, Platforms Want Cen-
tralized Censorship. That Should Scare You, WIRED (Apr. 18, 2019, 9:00 AM), https:// 
www.wired.com/story/platforms-centralized-censorship/ [https://perma.cc/GN69-
GZYL]. 
130. Next Steps for GIFCT, GIFCT (Sept. 23, 2019), https://gifct.org/press/next-steps-
gifct/ [https://perma.cc/X2YR-WUZJ]. 
131. See, e.g., Kristen E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 
474 (2017). 
132. See Brian Chang, From Internet Referral Units to International Agreements: Cen-
sorship of the Internet by the UK and EU, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 114, 120– 22 
(2018). 
133. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21, at 45– 46. 
134. Jason Pielemeier & Chris Sheehy, Understanding the Human Rights Risks Associ-
ated with Internet Referral Units, MEDIUM (Feb. 25, 2019), https://medium.com/global-
network-initiative-collection/understanding-the-human-rights-risks-associated-with-
internet-referal-units-by-jason-pielemeier-b0b3feeb95c9 [https://perma.cc/A8CJ-AL5J]. 
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Despite the increasingly intertwined relationship between business 
and law enforcement interests, platforms’ powerful role is subject to little 
oversight or accountability.  Many of the most powerful techniques to 
address crime, such as the terrorism and child sexual abuse hash 
databases, are formally private and voluntary.135  These techniques are 
specifically designed to ferret out unlawful content, and in the case of child 
sexual abuse imagery, to actually report it to the police.136  However, there 
is scant judicial or public oversight of these practices despite the close rela-
tion between platform reporting and law enforcement interests. Moreover, 
technology companies rarely seem to consider the role of their business 
models in whetting the public’s appetite for the very unlawful or undesir-
able content that they seek to suppress.137 
D. Copyright Enforcement 
Ex ante content recognition technologies developed by the private sec-
tor have also transformed copyright enforcement. In response to copyright 
takedown requests, companies have responded with a range of technical 
approaches, including facilitating site-wide deletion of content,138 and 
employing hashing or fingerprinting to identify and filter infringing con-
tent.139  These technologies have fundamentally altered intellectual prop-
erty enforcement online.140 
Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
(DMCA), online service providers are generally immune from secondary 
liability for copyright infringement when users transmit infringing mate-
rial through their platforms, unless the provider has “actual knowledge” or 
“awareness” of the infringing content.141  Europe has historically also 
embraced safe harbors for intermediary service providers that host user-
generated content.  Under the European Commission’s E-Commerce Direc-
135. See discussion supra Section I.C. 
136. United States v. Rosenschein, No. CR 16-4571 JCH, 2019 WL 4855428, at *6 
(D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2019). In the United States, numerous federal courts have held that 
online service providers are not government “agents.” But in one case, discovery as to 
the nature of the relationship between PhotoDNA and law enforcement is still ongoing. 
Id. (agreeing to “honor Microsoft’s commitment to provide agreements pertaining to 
PhotoDNA and any federal law enforcement agency or State Attorney General, and 
agreements with third parties regarding hash sharing.”). See also United States v. Steven-
son, 727 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 367 
(4th Cir. 2010). 
137. See Julia Alexander, YouTube Still Can’t Stop Child Predators in Its Comments, 
VERGE (Feb. 19, 2019, 12:50 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/19/18229938/ 
youtube-child-exploitation-recommendation-algorithm-predators [https://perma.cc/ 
4T4P-2E4S]. 
138. Copyright Management Tools, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/ 
answer/9245819?hl=en&ref_topic=9282364 [https://perma.cc/2AYX-F6A4] (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2019). 
139. Alexander, supra note 137. 
140. Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online 
Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81, 93– 94 (2010); Annemarie Bridy, Internet Pay-
ment Blockades, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1523, 1538 n. 100 (2015) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)– (d) 
(2012)). 
141. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (1999). 
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tive, member states may not hold intermediary service providers liable for 
content posted by users, so long as providers lack “actual knowledge of 
illegal activity or information,” or “act[ ] expeditiously to remove or to dis-
able access” once they gain knowledge.142 
Both the European and U.S. regimes are reactive, not proactive, and 
emphasize the need for timely deletion upon request: a “notice and take-
down” regime.143  Providers generally only “know” of infringement once a 
copyright holder notifies the provider that a specific piece of content 
infringes their copyright.  Both Section 512 of the DMCA and the 
E-Commerce Directive explicitly disavow the intention to require service 
providers to monitor content that was hosted for or generated by users for 
illegality.144  Under the DMCA, service providers have no statutory obliga-
tions to “monitor” their platforms or “affirmatively seek[ ] facts indicating 
infringing activity,” unless doing so is a “standard technical measure.”145 
The E-Commerce Directive likewise bars member states from imposing 
general obligations on intermediaries “to monitor the information which 
they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or 
circumstances indicating illegal activity.”146  In addition, Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights also limits third-party liability for 
user-generated online content on free expression grounds.147 
While service providers were not required to develop or deploy proac-
tive monitoring or filtering techniques, they soon did so anyway. The 
scope and extent of copyright infringement made ex post notice and take-
down a deeply unsatisfying remedy for copyright holders, who also urged 
legislators and regulators to require platforms to do more to stem the tide 
of infringing content.148  In 1997, a number of commercial copyright own-
ers and providers of user-generated content (UGC) services entered into 
142. E-Commerce Directive 2000/31, supra note 40, at art. 14. 
143. See Jennifer M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown: Online Service Provider and 
Rightsholder Accounts of Everyday Practice, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 371, 373 (2017). 
144. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m); E-Commerce Directive 2000/31, supra note 40, at art. 15. 
145. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1). Cf. id. § 512(i)(2) (defining “standard technical mea-
sures” as measures that are “developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright own-
ers and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process; 
are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms; and do not 
impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their systems or 
networks.”). See also Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technol-
ogy Standard, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 1200 (2011) (“[S]ection 512 does not require 
webhosts to monitor content on their site ex ante as a prerequisite for enjoying the safe 
harbor.”). 
146. E-Commerce Directive 2000/31, supra note 40, at art. 15. 
147. See Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete v. Hungary, 2016 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 
11– 15 (finding that Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
limits third-party liability for online content); but see Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2013 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 1, 33– 34 (finding that imposing liability for unlawful, online hate speech does not 
offend Article 10 of the ECHR). 
148. COHEN, supra note 10, at 123– 24 (describing the copyright wars). See also NICO-
LAS P. SUZOR, LAWLESS: THE SECRET RULES THAT GOVERN OUR DIGITAL LIVES 76– 78 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 2019) (describing efforts to pass the Stop Online Piracy Act and the 
Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property 
Act, and require Internet platforms to do more to combat infringement). 
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the “UGC Principles,” a non-binding set of principles that, among other 
things, called for UGC services to use “effective content identification tech-
nology” to eliminate infringing content from their services.149 
YouTube’s fingerprinting technology, Content ID, is a prime example 
of automated copyright enforcement.150  Content ID, created in 2007, 
matches references submitted by copyright owners against user uploads to 
YouTube’s website.151  Using Content ID and similar fingerprint-based sys-
tems, rightsholders can opt to block infringing content in user-generated 
videos.  Large rightsholders have developed automated mechanisms to 
detect, track, and report online infringement as well as to generate take-
down requests.152  And service providers have also adopted automated 
means to respond to notices of claimed infringement, thereby “auto-
mat[ing] the process in order to manage floods of requests.”153 
But Content ID illustrates that the dispute about proactive filtering of 
infringing content is not merely about deleting or blocking said content. 
Automated copyright enforcement has also enabled rightsholders to 
explore other remedies beyond takedown. For example, in addition to 
blocking content, Content ID also allows rightsholders to monetize that 
content— to redirect any revenue from the user who generated the video to 
the rightsholder— or to track the usage of that content.154  The ability to 
monitor and monetize infringement remedies what rightsholders call the 
“value gap”155 between what YouTube pays for monetized content and 
what services such as Spotify or Pandora, which license content directly 
from rightsholders, pay.  Automated copyright enforcement provides a 
wealth of avenues for rightsholders to redress the “value gap” through 
means other than blocking access to content, for example, by monetizing or 
surveilling the usage or viewing patterns of content.156 
149. Principles for User Generated Content Services, UGC, https://ugcprinciples.com 
[https://perma.cc/V4XQ-PPXG] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020). See also Lauren G. Gallo, 
The (Im)possibility of “Standard Technical Measures” for UGC Websites, 34 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 283, 295 (2011) (describing how “all major right holders and all major UGCs,” 
even the ones that had declined to join the UGC Principles, had adopted some kind of 
content fingerprinting technology). 
150. Annemarie Bridy, The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”: How the Music Industry 
Hacked EU Copyright Reform, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH L. 323, 330 (2020) [hereinafter 
The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”]. 
151. Qualifying for Content ID, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/ 
answer/1311402 [https://perma.cc/Y6XV-LQUN] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020). 
152. Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1087 (2017); 
Urban et al., supra note 143, at 374. 
153. Elkin-Koren, supra note 152, at 1087. 
154. See Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 11, at 480, 510. See also Miguel Helft, Google 
Told to Turn Over User Data of YouTube, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2008), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/07/04/technology/04youtube.html [https://perma.cc/E6QN-
D5JA] (describing how, in the Viacom contributory infringement case against YouTube, 
YouTube was required to produce data regarding user viewing histories). 
155. See, e.g., Medium: Five Stubborn Truths About YouTube and the Value Gap, RIAA 
NEWS (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.riaa.com/medium-five-stubborn-truths-youtube-
value-gap/ [https://perma.cc/ECV6-CH2X]. 
156. See, e.g., AUDIBLE  MAGIC, https://www.audiblemagic.com/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2C6M-XCB4] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020). 
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As technology has facilitated faster and farther-reaching takedown 
requests, many have cautioned that compliance with this framework may 
lead to over-deletion of lawful content. In particular, as one important 
study of notice and takedown found, “the rise of mass notice sending via 
automated systems raises immediate questions of accuracy and due pro-
cess,” because the sheer scale of automated notice sending makes it diffi-
cult to analyze the legal issues presented or understand whether notices are 
sent with bad faith.157 
The architecture of Content ID, Audible Magic, and similar “finger-
printing” technologies also necessarily raises difficult questions about con-
text.  Fingerprinting techniques work by automatically screening user-
generated content against an existing database of copyright-protected con-
tent: any clip of copyrighted material that matches protected content will 
be flagged as infringement.158  The result is that, in their current form, 
automated systems for detecting copyright infringement are often incapa-
ble of detecting uses of copyrighted works that are non-infringing, includ-
ing fair use.159  The same is true for other exceptions that carve out other 
kinds of creative reuses of copyrighted materials, including “quotation, 
criticism, and review,” or “caricature, parody, or pastiche.”160 
The need for an authoritative set of unlawful content, therefore, limits 
the applications of hash- or fingerprint-based technology.  Consider the dif-
ficulty of using a fingerprinting approach to identify “hate speech.” Com-
piling an authoritative set of “hate speech” would be impossible in its own 
right, and any effort to do so would be necessarily, indelibly influenced by 
political and social judgment.  For instance, while it is a criminal offense 
under German law to display a swastika, the law recognizes several con-
text-dependent exceptions, including “to promote art or science, research 
or teaching, reporting about current or historical events, or similar pur-
poses.”161  A fingerprinting-based approach that identified photographs of 
swastikas as impermissible would also include journalism, art, and 
research in its sweep.  It is nearly impossible to imagine such an approach 
being useful to platforms or to law enforcement. 
While fingerprinting and hashing technologies are unlikely to help-
fully address highly context-dependent questions, they are quite effective 
modes of public-private cooperation on policing content that is predeter-
mined to be unlawful.162  This explains their use in settings like child sex-
157. Urban et al., supra note 143, at 406– 09. 
158. Core Technology & Services Overview, AUDIBLE MAGIC (2015), https://www.audi 
blemagic.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/AM_overview_datasheet_150406.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z6AU-HN89] (describing “fingerprint” technology). 
159. See Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, supra note 11, at 715. 
160. See Article 13 in 10 Questions, ARTICLE 13, https://www.article13.org/faq [https:/ 
/perma.cc/ULE4-6QU4] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020). 
161. STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL  CODE], § 86, para. 3, translation at https:// 
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html [https://perma.cc/BDU4-
7PGM] (Ger.). 
162. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 104, at 701 (describing how the National Software 
Reference Library provides hash sets for standard files to law enforcement to ease com-
puter searches). 
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ual abuse imagery, in which a speaker is liable regardless of context.163 
But today, the content moderation decisions that platforms often seek to 
automate require more contextual analysis and human judgment than 
screening for unlawful content.  Thus, platforms increasingly rely upon a 
combination of fingerprinting approaches, machine learning, and human 
decision-making to engage in content moderation.  As large platforms set 
and enforce ground rules for membership, participation, and exclusion 
from online communities, they rely on a “bionic” combination of ex ante 
automated screening with ex post analysis by human moderators and 
algorithmic decision-making technologies.164 
II. From Reactive to Proactive 
Put simply, although the dominant mode of regulating unlawful con-
tent was reactive, platforms quickly developed their own proactive method-
ologies, transforming their ability to enforce private rules and lending their 
technological capabilities to the enforcement of offline laws. Today, how-
ever, the terms of these bargains are dramatically contested, as lawmakers 
in Europe and elsewhere consider and adopt requirements that platforms 
engage in ex ante monitoring and filtering. 
In the discussion that follows, this Part maps new proactive monitor-
ing requirements along several axes: the expanding role of private enforce-
ment of technology and quasi-legal protections as instruments of private 
governance, the relationship between law enforcement agencies and pri-
vate entities, the expansion of the kinds of content considered unlawful, 
and the dueling emphases on rapid takedowns and due process for restor-
ing wrongfully deleted content.  As platforms invest in artificial intelligence 
and algorithmic content moderation to counter the flood of toxic informa-
tion, other government actors are seizing on their promises about the 
capacity of technology and asking platforms to do even more to proactively 
head off these threats. 
A. Copyright 
Article 17 of the EU Copyright Directive (Article 17), which was for-
merly known as Article 13, has fundamentally altered Europe’s intermedi-
ary safe harbor protections.165  Article 17 makes “online content-sharing 
service providers” liable when users upload copyright-infringing content 
163. See Gabriel J.X. Dance & Michael H. Keller, How Laws Against Child Sexual Abuse 
Imagery Can Make It Harder to Detect, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/us/online-child-sex-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/ 
4TQS-9HW9] (explaining how the ban on possessing or viewing child sexual abuse 
imagery has slowed down the private sector’s development of new tools to detect it). 
164. See Content Moderation: The Future is Bionic, ACCENTURE 1, 2 (2017), https:// 
www.accenture.com/cz-en/_acnmedia/PDF-47/Accenture-Webscale-New-Content-Mod 
eration-POV.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP2Q-W42W]. 
165. Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 
2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Direc-
tives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, art. 17, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92, 120 [hereinafter Copy-
right Directive 2019/790]. 
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unless the providers make their “best efforts” to license the content from 
the rights holder.166  In addition, the new provisions require providers to 
“ensure the unavailability” of unlicensed content and to “expeditiously” 
remove and block future uploads of infringing content.167  The provisions 
will apply to any provider that is over three years old, no matter how small, 
raising concerns that they will further entrench the dominance of existing 
platforms.168 
Although Article 17 does not explicitly require proactive monitoring of 
user content— indeed, the provision states that it “shall not lead to any gen-
eral monitoring obligation”— numerous critics have pointed out that it will 
nonetheless have the de facto effect of leading to proactive monitoring.169 
As German Member of European Parliament Julia Reda has described these 
provisions, service providers “will have no choice but to deploy upload fil-
ters” to block infringing content.170 
Yet, despite strongly encouraging proactive, ex ante screening of user-
generated content, Article 17 gives scant guidance to online content-shar-
ing service providers regarding the technical methodologies of monitoring 
user-generated content or blocking infringement. Though it recognizes 
that automated, content screening will, by its very nature, broadly affect 
free expression, the Copyright Directive places no limitations on its design 
or use, instead putting its faith in platforms to develop mechanisms to 
review the individual challenges of blocking decisions.171 
Rather than challenging the central position of major online platforms 
in the digital economy, Article 17 thus reaffirms it.  This dynamic is partly 
a response to the logic of scale: the experience of Content ID already illus-
trates that, as platforms develop techniques for policing infringement, 
rightsholders demand broader and more extensive applications.172 
Allowing platforms to develop technical measures for compliance virtually 
ensures that ex ante content moderation minimizes the potential risk of 
liability. 
Although proponents of Article 17 described the provision as enhanc-
ing “platform accountability,” the broad discretion it confers on technology 
166. Id. at art. 17. See also The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”, supra note 150, at 
357– 58. 
167. Copyright Directive 2019/790, supra note 165, at art. 17(4). 
168. The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”, supra note 150, at 355– 56. 
169. See, e.g., id. at 353 (“the preventive measures demanded in the adopted text can-
not realistically be achieved at scale without an [automated content recognition] system 
like Content ID.”); Danny O’Brien, EU’s Parliament Signs Off on Disastrous Internet Law: 
What Happens Next?, EFF (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/03/ 
eus-parliament-signs-disastrous-internet-law-what-happens-next [https://perma.cc/ 
BA43-F6SL] (describing the inconsistency between Article 17 and the E-Commerce 
Directive). 
170. The Text of Article 13 and the EU Copyright Directive Has Just Been Finalized, JULIA 
REDA (Feb. 13, 2019), https://juliareda.eu/2019/02/eu-copyright-final-text/ [https:// 
perma.cc/DG2K-T6SN]. 
171. Id. 
172. See, e.g., The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”, supra note 150, at 108– 11; Helft, 
supra note 154. 
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companies will, in the long term, serve only to further empower them.173 
Indeed, Article 17’s approach exemplifies nearly unbridled deference to 
technology for addressing copyright infringement, as well as deference to 
the kinds of procedures that platforms believe safeguard due process.174 
Advocates of the provisions have deemphasized the significance of these 
changes, suggesting that because YouTube already employs Content ID to 
filter uploads, the new provisions will just be more of the same.175 
Article 17’s safeguards likewise shift the costs of protecting free 
expression to individual users.176  Instead of requiring rightsholders to 
submit notices of claimed infringement, the Copyright Directive puts the 
onus on users to file a “counter-notice” demonstrating that their use of a 
copyrighted work falls into an exception or limitation to copyright protec-
tion.177  While this mechanism formally pays lip service to the need to 
protect free expression, empirical studies have shown that counter-notice 
has served as an ineffective check on over-blocking.178 
Not only does the Copyright Directive stress the need for expeditious 
takedowns, it also emphasizes the need for an “effective complaint and 
redress mechanism” in achieving the appropriate balance between free 
expression and copyright protection.179  While it encourages platforms to 
use automated means to facilitate takedowns, Article 17(9) requires plat-
forms to enact appeal mechanisms subject to “human review” without 
“undue delay.”  By creating a system in which takedowns are automated, 
but appeals are manual, Article 17 ensures that while takedowns occur at 
scale, appeals almost certainly cannot. 
Although private-sector innovation may address some of the substan-
tive concerns about over-blocking and other burdens on protected expres-
sion, the Copyright Directive also raises questions about competition.180 
By remaining silent on the design of algorithmic filtering, Article 17 does 
not create specific incentives for platforms to innovate in ways that pro-
173. See., e.g., Madigan, supra note 8 (describing online platforms as “the most pow-
erful and wealthy entities in the world”); Europe Takes an Important Step Toward Platform 
Accountability With Directive on Copyright, AAP (Sept. 13, 2018), https://news-
room.publishers.org/europe-takes-an-important-step-toward-platform-accountability-
with-directive-on-copyright/ [https://perma.cc/SW9D-CYZP]. 
174. Cf. Madigan, supra note 8. 
175. Robert Levine, Mind the Value Gap: Will Europe Address the Legal Loophole That 
Lets YouTube Pay Less for Music?, BILLBOARD (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.billboard. 
com/articles/business/8474670/mind-value-gap-europe-address-legal-loophole-lets-you 
tube-pay-less-music-column [https://perma.cc/M9NG-FABU]. 
176. See generally Urban et al., supra note 143. 
177. Id. 393– 94, 405. 
178. Elkin-Koren, supra note 152, at 1091– 92; Urban et al., supra note 143, at 
406– 10. 
179. See Copyright Directive 2019/790, supra 165, at 108. 
180. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 152, at 1097 (suggesting that improvements to filter-
ing technology might mitigate some of the concerns that proactive screening sweeps too 
broadly: as automated copyright enforcement moves toward artificial intelligence and 
machine learning, platforms may be able to design systems that are friendlier to fair uses 
and that “learn patterns of fair use instances by studying existing fair use decisions”). 
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mote fair use.181  Moreover, many of the companies that have already devel-
oped proactive filtering and blocking software stand to benefit enormously 
from the uptick in new customers. Indeed, the German Data Protection 
Commissioner has raised concerns that, because Article 17 all but requires 
upload filters, small companies will rely on the filtering technologies of 
larger platforms, leading to the emergence of an “oligopoly” of filtering 
software.182 
B. Unlawful Speech 
Despite the fact that most of the large platforms are now using proac-
tive automated means to filter and block terrorist content on a purportedly 
voluntary basis, the availability and widespread positive publicity about 
automated, ex ante monitoring and blocking of extremist content has 
prompted multiple government actors to enact, or consider, legislation that 
would make this technology virtually compulsory. In spring 2019, Austra-
lia enacted a law that will impose significant penalties on online service 
providers if they fail to rapidly remove “abhorrent violent material” from 
their services.183  Under the new statute, providers of online “content ser-
vices” commit a criminal offense if their services host “abhorrent violent 
material” that they fail to “expeditiously” remove.184  The statute does not 
define “expeditiously,” but the Australian Attorney General expressed, in a 
reading speech, his conviction that platforms could address these concerns 
through the use of technology.185  The statute applies regardless of the size 
of the company.186 
Germany’s new Network Enforcement Act of 2018, colloquially 
known as NetzDG, similarly imposes burdens on social media platforms, 
and these burdens virtually require the use of upload filters.  Under 
181. Stan Adams, Why the EU Copyright Directive Is a Threat to Fair Use, CTR. DEMOC-
RACY & TECH. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://cdt.org/blog/why-the-eu-copyright-directive-is-a-
threat-to-fair-use/ [https://perma.cc/4LDJ-ACHG]. 
182. Press Release, Copyright Reform Also Harbors Data Protection Risks, BFDI (Feb. 
26, 2019) (available at https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=de&u=https:// 
www.bfdi.bund.de/DE/Infothek/Pressemitteilungen/2019/10_Uploadfilter.html& 
prev=search&pto=aue [https://perma.cc/BW9U-V2RD]) [hereinafter BFDI Press 
Release] (“Ultimately, such an oligopoly would result in fewer providers of filter technol-
ogies, through which more or less all of the internet traffic of relevant platforms and 
services runs.”). 
183. Damien Cave, Australia Passes Law to Punish Social Media Companies for Violent 
Posts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/world/austra-
lia/social-media-law.html [https://perma.cc/5JPH-VL5G]. 
184. Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act 2019 (Cth) 
s 474.34 (Austl.). 
185. Evelyn Douek, Australia’s “Abhorrent Violent Material” Law: Shouting “Nerd 
Harder” And Drowning Out Speech, 94 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 41 (forthcoming 2020) [hereinaf-
ter Australia’s “Abhorrent Violent Material” Law]. See also Daphne Keller, Three Constitu-
tional Thickets: Why Regulating Online Violent Extremism Is Hard, GEORGE  WASH. 
PROGRAM ON  EXTREMISM 1, 3 (2019), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs 
2191/f/Three%20Constitutional%20Thickets.pdf [https://perma.cc/J48E-URDT] [here-
inafter Three Constitutional Thickets] (summarizing the current status of several statutes 
pushing platforms to take down extreme content more quickly). 
186. See Australia’s “Abhorrent Violent Material” Law, supra note 185. 
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NetzDG, platforms must remove certain kinds of “manifestly unlawful” 
speech— defined by reference to the German criminal code— within twenty-
four hours or face heavy penalties.187  NetzDG applies to social network 
providers with two million, or more, registered users in Germany.188 
The EU’s draft  regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist 
content online likewise requires platforms to remove or disable access to 
“terrorist content” within one hour, or face heavy fines.189  The draft regu-
lation also adopts a relatively broad definition of “terrorist content,” which 
includes not only direct incitement but also “glorifying” terrorist crimes or 
“depicting the commission” of a terrorist offense.190 
Like Article 17, the AVM law, NetzDG, and the EU’s draft terrorism 
regulation do not overtly require platforms to adopt proactive screening 
methodologies.  Nevertheless, their efforts to scale enforcement of the law 
push them in that direction.  Google’s NetzDG transparency report, for 
instance, documents how it uses hashing, fingerprinting, and automated 
flagging technologies to try to identify unlawful content more quickly.191 
Yet it is particularly difficult to automate compliance with these kinds 
of provisions because determining whether speech is unlawful depends on 
the context.  For instance, NetzDG reaches far more broadly than “terrorist 
content” and applies to unlawful content that includes “public incitement 
to commit offences” and “disturbing public peace by threatening to commit 
offences.”192  The difficulty of conducting complex, fact-dependent analy-
sis of whether material is, in fact, unlawful helps to explain why, as Google 
notes, “[m]achine automation simply cannot replace human judgment and 
nuance.”193 
This difficulty actually prompted the European Parliament to abandon 
an earlier effort that required platforms to develop new proactive technolo-
gies of automated content moderation, and instead endorse a narrower 
approach of requiring “specific” measures short of proactive monitor-
ing.194  Under an earlier version of the draft terrorism regulation, these 
measures could include automated removal of content, automated preven-
187. Evelyn Douek, Germany’s Bold Gambit to Prevent Online Hate Crimes and Fake 
News Takes Effect, LAWFARE (Oct. 31, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
germanys-bold-gambit-prevent-online-hate-crimes-and-fake-news-takes-effect [https:// 
perma.cc/V9ZU-BRN3]. 
188. Id. (noting that “registered” users is more inclusive than “active” users). 
189. European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 17 April 2019 on the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Preventing the Dissemination 
of Terrorist Content Online, at art. 4(2), COM (2018) P8_TA(2019)0421 (Sept. 4, 2019) 
[hereinafter Draft Terrorism Regulation]. 
190. Id. at art. 2. 
191. Removals Under the Network Enforcement Law, GOOGLE, https://transparencyre-
port.google.com/netzdg/youtube?hl=en [https://perma.cc/SF24-X6ZK] (last visited Feb. 
5, 2020) [hereinafter Removals]. 
192. STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL  CODE], §§ 111, 126, translation at https:// 
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html [https://perma.cc/BDU4-
7PGM] (Ger.). 
193. Removals, supra note 191. 
194. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Preventing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online, at art. 6, COM (2018) 640 final 
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tion of re-uploading, or “detecting, identifying and expeditiously removing” 
new terrorist content.195  The push toward automation responded directly 
to fears that “the longer the content is able to survive online, the more 
views it may receive, and the more harm it may cause.”196  Strikingly, the 
European Commission had argued that requiring platforms, on pain of lia-
bility, to develop technologies to filter and monitor content was still consis-
tent with the E-Commerce Directive’s immunity provision.197 
The European Parliament’s version of the draft terrorism regulation is 
also more sensitive to the risk that these obligations might tend to entrench 
dominant platforms.  The regulation instructs that any request for “specific 
measures” that platforms ought to take should account for the “technical 
feasibility of the measures, the size and economic capacity” of the platform, 
and the effects of the measures on free expression and the free flow of 
information.198  The draft regulation also makes clear that any penalties, 
including fines, should account for the “financial resources” of the plat-
form, whether the platform is a start-up or a small- to medium-sized busi-
ness, and whether it could comply with a removal order.199 
Platforms have generally opposed laws that impose these kinds of 
obligations.  Facebook vigorously opposed NetzDG, for example, arguing 
that the state was “pass[ing] on its own shortcomings and responsibilities 
to private companies.”200  Similarly, a consortium of technology compa-
nies opposed the Australian AVM measure, arguing that the government 
did not consult with the technology sector before drafting the bill.201 
Whether required by law or not, however, platforms are in fact com-
mitting to develop proactive, automated screening methodologies in 
(Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Commission Draft Terrorism Regulation] (calling for proac-
tive monitoring). 
195. Id. 
196. Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment, at 13, SWD (2018) 408 
final (Sept. 12, 2018). 
197. See Commission Draft Terrorism Regulation, supra note 194, at § 1.2 (“The present 
proposal is consistent with the acquis related to the Digital Single Market and in particu-
lar the E-Commerce Directive.”). 
198. Draft Terrorism Regulation, supra note 189, at art.6. See also Creating a French 
Framework to Make Social Media Platforms More Accountable: Acting in France with a 
European Vision, CRE 1, 17 (2019), http://thecre.com/RegSM/wp-content/uploads/ 
2019/05/French-Framework-for-Social-Media-Platforms.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7S7-
HFJQ] (suggesting a sliding scale of compliance obligations depending on the size of the 
operator and its service). 
199. Draft Terrorism Regulation, supra note 189, ¶ 38. When this Article was finalized 
in April 2020, the draft regulation was undergoing trialogue negotiations. Leaked docu-
ments suggested that these Parliamentary changes were not going to be included in the 
final text. See EU Online Terrorist Content Legislation Risks Undermining Press Freedom, 
CPJ (Mar. 11, 2020, 6:46 AM), https://cpj.org/2020/03/eu-online-terrorist-content-legis-
lation-press-freedom.php [https://perma.cc/D49P-JWF2]. The leaked documents sug-
gested that the final version of the regulation would not require automated filtering. Id. 
200. See Jefferson Chase, Facebook Slams Proposed German ‘Anti-Hate Speech’ Social 
Media Law, DEUTSCHE WELLE (May 29, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/facebook-slams-
proposed-german-anti-hate-speech-social-media-law/a-39021094 [https://perma.cc/ 
5JCR-227L]. 
201. See Cave, supra note 183. 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\53-1\CIN102.txt unknown Seq: 32  8-DEC-20 17:23
 
72 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 53 
response to political pressure as well as legislation. In particular, finger-
printing and hash-based screening are also being touted as code-based 
solutions to the problems of online hate speech and terrorist speech.202 
Nevertheless, as NetzDG illustrates, local laws are prompting platforms to 
develop proactive screening methodologies for a host of other types of 
illicit content and to invest in expanding ex post moderation capabilities. 
C. Defamation 
A third context in which regulators have compelled platforms to use 
automated means to filter or block online speech occurs in the context of 
court judgments ordering online platforms to screen user-generated con-
tent for future instances of illegality.  In October 2019, the European Court 
of Justice (CJEU) issued an opinion partially upholding an injunction that 
required Facebook to delete a comment calling Austrian politician Eva 
Glawischnig-Pieszek a “corrupt oaf” because it was defamatory under Aus-
trian law.203  At the core of Glawischnig-Pieszek’s case was her request for 
an injunction that would compel Facebook to delete any identical or 
“equivalent” statements posted by any user worldwide.204  Article 15 of the 
E-Commerce Directive precludes EU member states from imposing “gen-
eral obligations to monitor” the information transmitted or stored by host-
ing providers.205  In a previous case, SABAM v. Netlog, the CJEU had held 
that a Belgian court could not issue an injunction that “requires [a host] to 
install a system for filtering” specific types of content “indiscriminately” as 
to all of its users.206 
Nonetheless, the CJEU concluded that the Austrian court could, con-
sistent with Article 15, order Facebook to remove defamatory material, 
identical reposts, and “information, the content of which, whilst essentially 
conveying the same message, is worded slightly differently.”207  At the root 
202. See, e.g., Sissi Cao, Facebook’s AI Chief Explains How Algorithms Are Policing Con-
tent— And Whether It Works, OBSERVER (Dec. 6, 2019,  7:15 AM), https://observer.com/ 
2019/12/facebook-artificial-intelligence-chief-explain-content-moderation-policy-limita-
tion/ [https://perma.cc/4V29-QHAL] (“And, in addition to that, we have a number of AI 
tools that we are developing, like the ones that I had mentioned, that can proactively go 
flag the content.”). 
203. Case C– 18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ir. Ltd., 2019 E.C.R. ¶ 53. See 
also DAPHNE KELLER, DOLPHINS IN THE NET: INTERNET CONTENT FILTERS AND THE ADVOCATE 
GENERAL’S GLASWISCHNIG-PIESCZEK V. FACEBOOK  IRELAND  OPINION 2 (Stanford Ctr. for 
Internet & Soc’y 2019). 
204. Glawischnig-Piesczek, 2019 E.C.R. ¶ 20. 
205. E-Commerce Directive 2000/31, supra note 40, at art. 15. See also Aleksandra 
Kuczerawy, To Monitor or Not to Monitor? The Uncertain Future of Article 15 of the E-
Commerce Directive, BALKINIZATION (May 29, 2019), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/ 
05/to-monitor-or-not-to-monitor-uncertain.html [https://perma.cc/4ACH-B4JM]. 
206. Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog, 2012 E.C.R. ¶ 26. See also Case C-484/14, Mc 
Fadden v. Sony Music Entm’t Ger. GmbH, 2016 E.C.R. ¶ 87; Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. 
eBay, 2011 E.C.R. ¶ 139 (“The measures required of the online service provider con-
cerned cannot consist in an active monitoring of all the data of each of its customers in 
order to prevent any future infringement of intellectual property rights via that pro-
vider’s website.”). 
207. Glawischnig-Piesczek, 2019 E.C.R. ¶ 41. 
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of the CJEU ruling is the conviction that Facebook can use “automated 
search tools and technologies” to identify new posts of offending mate-
rial.208  Resting on this assumption, the CJEU held that the injunction was 
permissible so long as it identified “specific elements . . . such as . . . 
equivalent content to that which was declared to be illegal,” and so long as 
Facebook was not required to conduct an “independent assessment” of 
whether content was covered or not.209 
The opinion neglected to examine several critical aspects of the relief 
Glawischnig-Pieszek sought, however.  First, algorithmic filtering of defam-
atory statements is difficult because it requires context: how could auto-
mated methods, for instance, tell the difference between a defamatory 
comment and a news report on the case?210  As Jennifer Daskal and Kate 
Klonick pointed out before the opinion came down, “it’s much more diffi-
cult than it sounds to define, let alone reliably identify, an ‘identical’ 
post.”211  Moreover, the record of automated search tools and technologies 
that Facebook has at hand to conduct such monitoring, blocking, and fil-
tering is scant.  In particular, the CJEU offered no evidence to support its 
impression that the “search tools and technologies” that Facebook has 
access to neither required “independent assessment” nor constituted 
“indiscriminate” filtering.212 
By suggesting that the availability of “automated search tools and tech-
nologies” minimized the role Facebook had to play in determining whether 
content was within the scope of the injunction, the CJEU expressed— 
whether intentionally or not— a latent trust in the capacity of automated 
systems to make judgments about content.213  In so doing, the CJEU 
seemed to rely on Advocate General Maciej Szpunar’s conclusion that 
requiring Facebook to monitor and delete reposting of identical statements 
was a proportionate remedy because “seeking and identifying information 
identical to that which has been characterized as illegal by a court . . . does 
not require sophisticated techniques that might represent an extraordinary 
burden.”214  Instead, the Advocate General suggested that “identical” state-
ments could be detected “with the help of software tools.”215 
In light of the scant factual record, it is difficult to understand Advo-
cate General Szpunar’s confidence in Facebook’s technology, much less the 
208. Id. ¶ 46. 
209. Id. ¶ 45. 
210. See generally KELLER, supra note 203 (analyzing the potential over inclusiveness 
of the approach urged by the Advocate General). Cf. James Vincent, Zuckerberg Criti-
cized over Censorship After Facebook Deletes ‘Napalm Girl’ Photo, VERGE (Sept. 9, 2016, 
5:18 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/9/9/12859686/facebook-censorship-
napalm-girl-aftenposten [https://perma.cc/6DZW-8JUS]. 
211. Jennifer Daskal & Kate Klonick, When a Politician Is Called a ‘Lousy Traitor,’ 
Should Facebook Censor It?, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/06/27/opinion/facebook-censorship-speech-law.html [https://perma.cc/C4A2-
TQ2W]. 
212. Glawischnig-Piesczek, 2019 E.C.R. ¶ 46. 
213. Id. ¶ 45. 
214. Id. ¶ 87 (separate opinion of Advocate General Maciej Szpunar). 
215. Id. ¶ 61. 
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CJEU’s determination that automated solutions could also discern content 
equivalent— but not identical— to defamation.216  But one might speculate 
that the widespread publicity about automated content moderation might 
seem to support the CJEU’s findings. Ironically, although platforms them-
selves have “trumpet[ed] the technologies’ capabilities” to avoid regulation, 
the CJEU may have had those promises in mind when it found that 
Facebook could use software magic to prevent the republication of defama-
tory content.217 
In a sense, the Glawischnig-Piesczek case is nothing new.  Courts have 
been fighting about the appropriate scope of injunctive relief for defama-
tion for decades.218  Injunctions against online intermediaries are uniquely 
effective methods of addressing defamation and other kinds of harmful 
speech, which is precisely why intermediary liability protections are so 
important.219  In that respect, there have been ongoing debates under 
European law about the boundary between appropriate injunctive relief on 
the one hand, and the unlawful imposition of a general monitoring obliga-
tion on the other.220  In the CJEU’s view, requiring Facebook to monitor 
and delete future posts that were identical or equivalent to those judged 
defamatory was well within this boundary. However, by tasking Facebook 
with using automated methods to detect content equivalent to defamation, 
the CJEU is in novel territory.  It is easy to imagine how the compliance 
technologies Facebook might use could be easily transferred to other con-
texts or settings. 
III. The Drawbacks of Proactive Moderation 
Governments increasingly view automated, content moderation as an 
appealing mechanism for solving the full range of “bad content” problems 
on social media.  Drawing on the apparent success of algorithmic copy-
right enforcement, automation is now being touted as a solution to the 
216. Id. ¶ 73. 
217. Internet Platforms, supra note 114, at 7. 
218. See, e.g., David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1, 6 (2013); Steve Tensmeyer, Constitutionalizing Equity: Consequences of 
Broadly Interpreting the “Modern Rule” of Injunctions Against Defamation, 72 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 43, 44 (2017). See generally Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior 
Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981); Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunc-
tions in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 157 (2007); John Calvin Jeffries, Rethink-
ing Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983). 
219. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Legal Jurisdiction and the Deterritorialization of 
Data, 71 VAND. L. REV. 11, 27– 28 (2018) (“Governments have always enacted regulation 
through powerful intermediaries.”). See also Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776, 789– 90 (Cal. 
2018); MARTIN  HUSOVEC, INJUNCTIONS  AGAINST  INTERMEDIARIES IN THE  EUROPEAN UNION: 
ACCOUNTABLE BUT  NOT  LIABLE? 57 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017); Eleonora Rosati, 
Intermediaries and IP: 5 Key Principles of EU Law, IPKAT (May 21, 2018), http://ipkit-
ten.blogspot.com/2018/05/intermediaries-and-ip-5-key-principles.html [https:// 
perma.cc/H9UT-7HDJ]. 
220. KELLER, supra note 203, at 29– 31; Eleonora Rosati, Material, Personal and Geo-
graphic Scope of Online Intermediaries’ Removal Obligations Beyond Glawischnig-Piesczek, 
C-18/18 and Defamation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. (forthcoming), available at https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3438102 [https://perma.cc/NZ26-3TAJ]. 
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problems of defamation, terrorist content, and other harmful speech 
online.221  This Part explores how requiring platforms to deploy automated 
means to restrict speech raises substantial concerns about collateral cen-
sorship, surveillance, algorithmic control, and private power.222 
A. Content Moderation as Censorship 
While early cyber enthusiasts predicted that the Internet would be a 
new world free of surveillance and speech regulation, intermediary immu-
nity, in fact, has not eliminated censorship and monitoring, but rather 
privatized them.223  Despite being nominally free of liability, platforms 
have proven to be vulnerable to what Jack Balkin calls “new-school” meth-
ods of speech regulation: “collateral censorship,” “public-private coopera-
tion and cooptation,” and “digital prior restraint.”224  When states coerce 
platforms to cooperate in censorship and surveillance, they play into the 
central dynamic that characterizes the uneasy relationship amongst users 
that depend on platforms for effective communication, platforms that 
depend on governments for a favorable regulatory environment, and gov-
ernments that depend on platforms to carry out vital law enforcement 
tasks.225 
Ex ante, automated content moderation aptly illustrates this dynamic. 
Calls to extend ex ante, automated content moderation to particular types 
or categories of speech create the risk of collateral censorship and digital 
prior restraint by threatening to hold platforms liable unless they censor 
speech at the government’s bidding.226  Moreover, the companies that con-
trol the “infrastructure of free expression” provide only weak protections 
when a government “uses that infrastructure, or its limitations, as leverage 
for regulation or surveillance.”227 
As it stands, automated content moderation already demonstrates the 
risk that technical “solutions” designed to prevent bad content from spread-
ing will have collateral effects on lawful expression. One recent, quantita-
tive analysis of a random sample of over 1,800 DMCA takedown requests, 
found that a significant number of requests either, incorrectly identified, or 
insufficiently specified, the allegedly infringing work.228  Despite these 
221. See discussion supra Part II. 
222. Portions of this Part draw on my previous article, see generally Bloch-Wehba, 
supra note 21. 
223. Free Speech Is a Triangle, supra note 10, at 2011– 15; Old-School/New-School 
Speech Regulation, supra note 12, at 2298– 99. See also Derek E. Bambauer, Against 
Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51, 57– 58 (2015) [hereinafter Against Jawboning]; Seth F. 
Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the 
Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 11 (2006). 
224. Free Speech Is a Triangle, supra note 10, at 2011. 
225. Id. at 2020, 2035, 2047. 
226. Id. at 2018– 19 (“Imposing liability on infrastructure providers unless they sur-
veil and block speech, or remove speech that others complain about, has many features 
of a prior restraint, although technically it is not identical to a classic prior restraint.”). 
227. Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, supra note 12, at 2303. 
228. URBAN ET AL., NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN IN EVERYDAY PRACTICE 2 (2d ed. 2017). See 
also Daphne Keller, Empirical Evidence of “Over-Removal” by Internet Companies Under 
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insufficiencies, material that is alleged to infringe a claimant’s copyright is 
routinely “removed before the target [of a takedown request] is given the 
opportunity to respond.”229  Users who are targeted by a wrongful take-
down request rarely send counter-notices, and the “unbalanced liability 
standards” of copyright make it legally risky for platforms to encourage 
their users to send counter-notices.230  The result is a regime in which the 
technical and legal infrastructure for DMCA compliance appears to have 
come at a significant cost to users’ interests in free expression. 
These trade-offs are not, of course, unique to copyright enforcement. 
Take, for example, the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism’s hash-
sharing database.  The chief virtue of the hash database is its efficiency: 
because the database is shared across platforms, it prevents users from 
effectively re-uploading videos and images that have already been identified 
as violent.231  But this efficiency comes at a substantial cost to free expres-
sion.  Like automated copyright enforcement, the hash database for violent 
extremist and terrorist content is “context-blind”— as Daphne Keller has 
put it, “an ISIS video looks the same, whether used in recruiting or in news 
reporting.”232  The result is that the hash database may have a dispropor-
tionately negative effect on news organizations, human rights defenders, 
and dissidents who seek to expose and comment on violence.233 
Platforms’ efforts to proactively monitor and block user expression 
raise three particular concerns about collateral censorship.  First, as a mat-
ter of substance, efforts to exclude certain categories of expression from 
public discourse are likely to target marginalized perspectives and under-
represented communities.234  Nowhere is this more evident than in efforts 
to define “terrorist” and “extremist” speech. When governments pressure 
platforms to more aggressively address terrorist or extremist content 
online, they often reflect the teachings of years of Islamophobic security 
policy.  As Amna Akbar has documented, the “discursive construct” of 
“radicalization” has irrevocably shaped government’s identification of the 
“terrorist threat.”235  As a result, many mundane aspects of daily life in 
Muslim communities are understood by law enforcement as potentially sig-
nificant indicators of “radicalism.”236  In turn, the technological infrastruc-
Intermediary Liability Laws, STAN. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Oct. 12, 2015), http:// 
cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/empirical-evidence-over-removal-internet-compan 
ies-under-intermediary-liability-laws [https://perma.cc/383C-6VAH] (summarizing sev-
eral studies). 
229. URBAN ET AL., supra note 228, at 118. 
230. Id. 
231. GIFCT Transparency Report, GIFCT, https://www.gifct.org/transparency/ 
[https://perma.cc/S7L4-5KE4] (last visited July 7, 2020). 
232. Internet Platforms, supra note 114, at 7. 
233. Land, supra note 10, at 7, 60– 61. 
234. See Sap et al., supra note 96, at 1668 (reviewing Perspective API’s disproportion-
ate flagging of African-American English speech as “toxic” and “rude”). 
235. Amna Akbar, Policing “Radicalization”, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809, 816 (2013). 
236. Id. at 827. See also Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA 
L. REV. 834, 834 (2015); Sahar F. Aziz, Losing the “War of Ideas:” A Critique of Counter 
Violent Extremism Programs, 52 TEX. INT’L L.J. 255, 257– 58 (2017). 
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tures that platforms then build, reflect government’s security priorities. 
Therefore, systems of automated content moderation build on social and 
political constructions of the terrorist threat— but which constructions, and 
at whose expense? 
Consider, for example, platforms’ inconsistent approaches to the prob-
lem of white nationalism, Nazism, and right-wing terrorism on the one 
hand, and to ISIS and al-Qaeda on the other.  Though major platforms took 
steps after Christchurch to eliminate white nationalism and separatism 
from their services, it appears that they still struggle with the issue. An 
ongoing civil rights audit of Facebook points out that the company’s ban 
extends only to content that explicitly uses the terms “white nationalism” 
or “white separatism,” and thus “leaves up content that expressly espouses 
white nationalist ideology” without using these keywords.237  In August 
2019, the Anti-Defamation League published a list of white nationalist 
groups still active on YouTube after it famously “purged” them.238  You-
Tube responded by removing some of the channels highlighted in the 
report, but many were able to restore access to the platform.239 
These examples highlight the possibility that platforms are applying 
their own content moderation rules in ways that are, if not outright dis-
criminatory, at the very least, underinclusive. Moreover, platforms high-
lighted the “effectiveness” of their filtering and blocking techniques as a 
signal to European and American legislators that they took the threat of 
Islamic terrorism seriously.240  But only after Christchurch, as political 
pressure to address white nationalist terrorism ramped up, did online plat-
forms begin to actually take this threat seriously. Even now, Facebook’s 
ongoing public relations campaign to counter accusations that the plat-
form discriminates against conservative viewpoints undermines its efforts 
to address white nationalism.241 
Second, as a matter of process, platforms and governments are also 
willing to tolerate higher error costs for speech that is identified as a prior-
237. Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit— Progress Report, FACEBOOK 1, 9 (2019), https:// 
about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/civilrightaudit_final.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/T8A5-QUX2] [hereinafter Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit]. 
238. Despite YouTube Policy Update, Anti-Semitic, White Supremacist Channels Remain, 
ADL (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.adl.org/blog/despite-youtube-policy-update-anti-
semitic-white-supremacist-channels-remain [https://perma.cc/82SV-J9RN]. 
239. Id. See also Alex Kaplan, YouTube Removed Some Channels Affiliated with White 
Nationalism— But Not All, MEDIA  MATTERS (Aug. 28, 2019, 2:26 PM), https:// 
www.mediamatters.org/white-nationalism/youtube-removed-some-channels-affiliated-
white-nationalism-not-all [https://perma.cc/T64E-82KU]. 
240. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21, at 44– 45 (documenting how EU policy evolved 
in response to a series of ISIS attacks in France). 
241. See Charlie Warzel, Why Will Breitbart Be Included in ‘Facebook News’?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/25/opinion/mark-zuck-
erberg-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/BK73-6XZL]; Jason Wilson, Leaked Emails 
Reveal Trump Aide Stephen Miller’s White Nationalist Views, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2019, 
2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/14/stephen-miller-leaked-
emails-white-nationalism-trump [https://perma.cc/CW8K-FKS4]. 
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ity for removal.242  For instance, YouTube’s recent “purge” of videos sup-
porting white supremacy and white nationalism also swept up videos that 
documented, reported on, and aimed to counteract those ideologies.243 
Experience has shown that systems designed to block certain kinds of 
speech are likely to be overinclusive— hardly a novel observation.244  In 
theory, overinclusiveness is a design flaw that can be overcome by techno-
logical innovation.245  But accepting high error rates within systems 
designed to monitor, block, filter, and monetize user expression is a politi-
cal decision.  In practice, the incentives for platforms to take “bad content” 
down always seem to outweigh the incentives to design systems with mini-
mal error rates or maximal accommodations for free speech.246  These 
political pressures influence informational filters, although they are rarely 
accounted for by designers.  Indeed, as companies find themselves scruti-
nized from all sides, political and social pressure will likely inform speech 
decisions as much as, or more than, technology alone. 
Third, the new wave of Internet regulation and the emergence of “vol-
untary” filtering illustrates the risk that governments will informally pres-
sure platforms to adopt limitations on speech (what Derek Bambauer has 
called “jawboning”).247  When governments do this through political 
means— for example, through formal regulation or legislation— that politi-
cal act is formally accountable to the public. But when governments pres-
sure platforms to use their private authority to take down certain types of 
speech— for example, because it violates their terms of service— they tend 
to do so in ways that are less visible and less accountable to the public.248 
242. Cf. Internet Platforms, supra note 114, at 7 (arguing that platforms with less 
money to invest in content recognition software “will, if forced to build filters, presuma-
bly be forced to tolerate high rates of false positives in order to avoid liability for false 
negatives”). 
243. Kyle Daly, YouTube to Ban Supremacist Content, Purge Videos, POLITICO (June 5, 
2019, 2:41 PM), https://politi.co/2HX3Jf2 [https://perma.cc/2RXZ-V739]; Kelly Weill, 
YouTube Crackdown on Extremism Also Deleted Videos Combating Extremism, DAILY BEAST 
(June 6, 2019, 3:20 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/youtube-crackdown-on-
extremism-also-deleted-videos-combating-extremism [https://perma.cc/5CCA-78B7]. 
244. See, e.g., Duarte et al., supra note 97, at 6. See also EVAN ENGSTROM & NICK FEAM-
STER, THE LIMITS OF FILTERING: A LOOK AT THE FUNCTIONALITY & SHORTCOMINGS OF CON-
TENT DETECTION TOOLS 19 (2017); J.M. Balkin, Comment, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and 
the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1133 (1996) [hereinafter 
Media Filters]; Derek Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 397 (2009) [hereinafter 
Cybersieves]; Internet Platforms, supra note 114, at 6 (describing errors in automated 
generation of DMCA takedown requests, and noting that systems for processing those 
requests sometimes, but not always, catch errors); Land, supra note 10, at 8. 
245. Elkin-Koren, supra note 152, at 1097; Media Filters, supra note 244, at 1153– 54 
(noting that two chief arguments against the V-Chip— that “parents will be unable to use 
[it] . . . [and that] children will be able to break through. . . .”— are really a “problem of 
technological design”). 
246. See, e.g., Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21, at 79 (describing the “lopsided incentives” 
to remove online content). 
247. Against Jawboning, supra note 223, at 57. 
248. Chang, supra note 132, at 120– 22; Land, supra note 10, at 15. 
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B. Content Moderation as Surveillance 
Automated content moderation also opens up new avenues for surveil-
lance and monitoring of users as individuals and as groups.249  In this 
respect, hash- or fingerprint-based technologies like Content ID and the 
GIFCT hash database are particularly troubling. The GIFCT hash database 
offers a ripe, new way for platforms to identify, cross-reference, and keep 
tabs on accounts that have posted terrorist content in the past. Platforms 
have claimed that the database includes around 100,000 hashed 
images.250  Yet, it is unclear whether, and under what circumstances, those 
images are shared with law enforcement. 
The hash database has significant potential as a counterterrorist tool 
far beyond taking down terrorist content.  Just as Content ID permits right-
sholders to opt to monitor viewing activity on infringing videos, law 
enforcement might opt to monitor engagement with terrorist posts on 
social media in order to map associations and networks of suspected sym-
pathizers, to understand the diffusion of propaganda, or simply to monitor 
those who have viewed dangerous online content.251  Indeed, some have 
raised concerns that systematically deleting terrorist content from major 
platforms will drive terrorist networks underground, thereby depriving 
government of a critical source of information.252 
Even apart from direct information sharing between GIFCT and the 
government, automated mechanisms illustrate how closely connected 
speech rights and surveillance are.  To understand how private, automated 
moderation mechanisms might play into existing law enforcement para-
digms, imagine that YouTube’s algorithm for screening extremist content 
prevents a user from uploading a television segment reporting on the Kur-
distan Worker’s Party, or the PKK.  Now imagine that a law enforcement 
249. See, e.g., Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 94– 95 (2014). The 
use of machine learning for algorithmic content moderation also has more concrete pri-
vacy harms beyond the context of law enforcement surveillance. For example, to the 
extent that platforms use machine learning methods which learn from user-generated 
content without the consent or knowledge of the users themselves, it might have signifi-
cant privacy implications. Id. 
250. Larry Greenemeier, Social Media’s Stepped-Up Crackdown on Terrorists Still Falls 
Short, SCI. AM. (July 24, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/social-
medias-stepped-up-crackdown-on-terrorists-still-falls-short/ [https://perma.cc/UEK4-
XJUG]. 
251. See, e.g., Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Process Without Procedure: National Security Let-
ters and First Amendment Rights, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 367, 381 (2016) (illustrating how 
national security letters are used to find associations and networks of individuals and 
groups). 
252. See, e.g., Bateman, supra note 25.  Strikingly, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) made a similar argument in defense of its decision to represent white nationalist 
protestors in advance of the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally in 2017. See Anthony 
D. Romero, Equality, Justice and the First Amendment, ACLU (Aug. 15, 2017, 6:00 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/equality-justice-and-first-amendment [https:// 
perma.cc/HU3L-CVKR] (“Racism and bigotry will not be eradicated if we merely force 
them underground.”). See also P.E. MOSKOWITZ, THE CASE AGAINST FREE SPEECH: THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT, FASCISM, AND THE FUTURE 18 (Bold Type Books 1st ed. 2019). 
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agency subpoenas YouTube for subscriber information pertaining to all 
users who have attempted to upload prohibited “terrorist” videos, among 
which our user is one. 
In several respects, this hypothetical illustrates how content modera-
tion rules— and the technical infrastructures that enforce them— might 
open new kinds of behavior and new actors to scrutiny that was previously 
beyond the state’s capabilities.  While a platform might use a human con-
tent moderator to determine whether the uploaded content should be per-
mitted or forbidden, law enforcement uses its investigative tools to 
determine whether the poster has committed a crime. When law enforce-
ment demands a list of all those users whose uploads were captured by an 
automated filter, it does not distinguish between them.253 
The result is that, in complying with this demand, YouTube is provid-
ing law enforcement with subscriber information for a fairly broad set of 
users whose only suspicious act was running afoul of an algorithm.  The 
platforms’ efforts to account for context in determining whether a user-
generated post is permitted or forbidden are irrelevant to law enforce-
ment.254  In addition, YouTube’s moderation practices make available 
information about a broader set of actors. The harmful act that once 
would have prompted law enforcement to monitor or surveil the user’s 
behavior— the actual dissemination of “terrorist content”— has been 
replaced by the unsuccessful attempt to distribute unlawful content.255 
Regardless of the fact that the attempt might, itself, be unlawful as a matter 
of substantive criminal law, we might question whether these attempts to 
distribute unlawful content are, by definition, sufficiently grave to warrant 
law enforcement action.256 
In a sense, the platforms’ ability to cheaply and easily generate a broad 
array of information relevant to law enforcement is simply an illustration 
of the extent to which private sector surveillance underpins law enforce-
ment investigations.257  The platforms’ ability— and, indeed, obligation— to 
generate this information is a classic example of a transformation in tech-
nology and society that expands police power by lowering the cost of sur-
253. See, e.g., Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit, supra note 237, at 10 (noting a variety of 
pilot efforts to better train human reviewers). 
254. For example, while YouTube tries to differentiate between videos that “discuss 
topics like pending legislation, aim to condemn or expose hate, or provide analysis of 
current events,” its automated filters are not fully capable of doing so. See Our Ongoing 
Work to Tackle Hate, supra note 126. 
255. Cf. Heidi R. Gilchrist, The Vast Gulf Between Attempted Mass Shooting & 
Attempted Material Support, 81 U. PITT. L. REV. 63, 84– 93 (2019). 
256. See Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and “Interna-
tional” Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1393 (2019) (noting that many attempted 
materials to support prosecutions “make[ ] little effort to distinguish between individu-
als with and without a plausible connection to grave international threats”). 
257. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (reasoning 
that warrantless access to cell site location records in the possession of third-party cell 
phone companies contravenes societal expectations that police will not “secretly moni-
tor and catalogue every single movement” individuals make). 
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veillance and expanding the ability to surveil in the first place.258  These 
shifts call into question the preexisting balance of power between the gov-
ernment and the public.259 
But platform surveillance also creates new opportunities for law 
enforcement precisely because these kinds of mechanisms are not as read-
ily observed— or evaded— as their physical equivalents.  To the extent that 
the new breed of content regulation constrains content moderation prac-
tices, it makes platforms a more attractive source for law enforcement seek-
ing to obtain information about users. Regardless of whether automated 
moderation techniques are required by law or simply adopted voluntarily, 
they increase the wealth of information available about users— their rela-
tionships, their interests, and their engagement with online content (all of 
which platforms already collect)— and that is highly relevant for law 
enforcement investigations.  Moreover, because most of these decisions 
occur behind closed doors, platform surveillance tends to operate in ways 
that are not amenable to public oversight or control.260 
C. Content Moderation as Algorithmic Control 
The shift toward automation in content moderation also underscores 
longstanding concerns about bias, fairness, transparency, and accountabil-
ity in machine learning and in automated systems more generally.261  As 
the private and public sectors increasingly rely on automation in ways that 
entrench power dynamics and impact individual rights and liberties, these 
concerns have come to the forefront of scholarship and public 
discourse.262 
One concern regards widespread overconfidence in technology itself 
as a mechanism for solving social and political problems.  Magical thinking 
about artificial intelligence (AI) is prevalent, even though few can even 
258. See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 500 (2011). 
259. Id. 
260. Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415– 16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring) (“[B]ecause GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance 
techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that 
constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community 
hostility.’ ”) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)). 
261. See, e.g., Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity in 
Machine Learning Algorithms, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.– June 2016, at 1, 4; Paul B. de Laat, 
Big Data and Algorithmic Decision-Making: Can Transparency Restore Accountability?, 
ACM COMPUTERS & SOC’Y, Sept. 2017, at 39, 45– 46; Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountabil-
ity in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 56 (2019); Joshua A. Kroll et 
al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 680 (2017); Fairness, Accountability, 
and Transparency in Machine Learning, FAT/ML, https://www.fatml.org [https://perma 
.cc/249S-ACSC] (last visited Feb. 4, 2020). 
262. See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa et al., Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 
735, 753 (2017); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 674 (2016); Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, 
Information, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1627 (2017); Pauline T. Kim, Data-
Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 863 (2017). 
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agree on what AI is.263  Policymakers are not immune to techno-optimism, 
but have proven vulnerable to its fallacies, embracing innovation by adopt-
ing risky technology in settings like healthcare, welfare, education, and 
criminal justice while failing to regulate AI in any meaningful way.264  In 
this regard, AI policy presents a particularly potent example of Edward 
Felten’s Third Law: “lawyers put too much faith in technical solutions, 
while technologists put too much faith in legal solutions.”265 
But overconfidence in technical solutions can have damaging effects. 
Far from serving as a neutral arbiter, the algorithms that Internet 
intermediaries use to rank and prioritize content often reflect and encode 
social bias.266  While publicly available displays, such as auto-complete 
suggestions or search results, can be interpreted as indications of 
algorithmic bias, other algorithms operate in ways that are more immune 
from scrutiny.267  As private platforms determine and control the condi-
tions under which researchers might access the information needed to 
study algorithmic bias in the first instance, they reinforce their own ability 
to control political and public narratives regarding algorithmic 
accountability.268 
The opacity of content moderation rules, algorithms, and decisions 
also alters the ways that online users perceive and experience online partic-
263. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 399, 406– 07 (2017) (describing varying, potential definitions for artificial 
intelligence); Arvind Narayanan, How to Recognize AI Snake Oil, PRINCETON U. 1, 6 
(2019), https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~arvindn/talks/MIT-STS-AI-snakeoil.pdf [https:/ 
/perma.cc/AME7-TM3P] (“Companies advertising AI as the solution to all problems 
have been helped along by credulous media.”). 
264. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 22, at 61; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 262, at 
671; Technological Due Process, supra note 11, at 1249; Mayson, supra note 11, at 2218; 
Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Jus-
tice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1346 (2018). 
265. Paul Ohm, Breaking Felten’s Third Law: How Not to Fix the Internet, 87 DENVER U. 
L. REV. ONLINE 50, 50 (2010) (quoting Edward Felten). 
266. See, e.g., SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES 
REINFORCE RACISM 2 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2018); Katyal, supra note 261, at 94 (arguing that 
stereotypes in search results might create a social feedback loop). 
267. For example, some Facebook users have reported a frustrating, Kafkaesque 
experience of having their accounts disabled for “suspicious activity” without recourse. 
Kashmir Hill, Many Are Abandoning Facebook. These People Have the Opposite Problem, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/business/reactivate-
facebook-account.html [https://perma.cc/VRC7-MNYD]. 
268. Facebook’s foundering partnership with Social Science One is a key example of 
this dynamic. See, e.g., Alex Pasternack, Frustrated Funders Exit Facebook’s Election 
Transparency Project, FAST  COMPANY (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/ 
90412518/facebooks-plan-for-radical-transparency-was-too-radical [https://perma.cc/ 
E765-TWTX]; Craig Silverman, Exclusive: Funders Have Given Facebook a Deadline to 
Share Data with Researchers or They’re Pulling Out, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 27, 2019, 4:53 
PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/funders-are-ready-to-pull-
out-of-facebooks-academic-data [https://perma.cc/3HUD-279C]; Gillian Tett, Why 
Facebook’s Data-Sharing Initiative Is Faltering, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www 
.ft.com/content/98b5385e-0025-11ea-b7bc-f3fa4e77dd47 [https://perma.cc/CA9X-
YU36]. 
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ipation.269  On the one hand, the apparent arbitrariness of moderation 
decisions— and of algorithmic moderation in particular— might heighten 
the need for transparency in order to promote legitimacy.  In response to 
shadowy decisions about user-generated content, users have developed 
what Sarah Myers West has charitably called “folk theories” regarding 
moderation.270  More transparency might promote user trust in the system, 
but it depends on how meaningful the disclosures are.271  On the other 
hand, meaningful transparency for ex ante, automated moderation tech-
niques would also undermine their effectiveness, likely resulting in more 
ex post screening.  If transparency enabled users to “reverse engineer” mod-
eration standards, it may result in users developing a novel, new vocabu-
lary to evade moderation— entrenching unwanted content while making it 
more difficult to detect.272 
Policymakers’ faith in the power of private innovation is perhaps most 
visible in contexts such as statutes that require technology companies to 
invest heavily in new, untested technologies of moderation, or court rul-
ings that assume platforms have technical capabilities not in evidence.273 
But when it comes to content moderation, much of this faith is misplaced. 
For example, in the aftermath of the Christchurch shooting, YouTube and 
Facebook users altered the footage slightly— for example, by surrounding it 
in a frame, or by posting video of the footage streaming in a second win-
dow— in order to get the footage past automated detection mechanisms.274 
These incidents illustrated how automated content moderation systems 
struggle to draw lines between protected and illicit content. 
These failures prompted widespread outrage, but addressing the prob-
lem using mechanical solutions would require greater efforts to suppress 
users’ posts.  Moreover, broader approaches to preventing the dissemina-
tion of unlawful content might result in platforms suppressing newsworthy 
posts in addition to “gratuitous graphic violence.”275  For content that 
inherently lacks any redeeming social value, such as child pornography or 
non-consensual pornography, the need to prevent harm might justify the 
269. See J. Nathan Matias, The Civic Labor of Volunteer Moderators Online, SOC. MEDIA 
& SOC’Y, Apr.– June 2019, at 1, 4– 5; Nicolas P. Suzor et al., What Do We Mean When We 
Talk About Transparency? Toward Meaningful Transparency in Commercial Content Modera-
tion, 13 INT’L J. COMM. 1526, 1527 (2019) [hereinafter What Do We Mean When We Talk 
About Transparency?]; Censored, Suspended, Shadowbanned, supra note 52, at 4366; Sarah 
Myers West, Raging Against the Machine: Network Gatekeeping and Collective Action on 
Social Media Platforms, MEDIA & COMM., Sept. 2017, at 28, 28. 
270. Censored, Suspended, Shadowbanned, supra note 52, at 4372– 74. 
271. Suzor et al., supra note 269, at 1527. 
272. See Chancellor et al., supra note 98, at 1201 (explaining how pro-eating disorder 
communities on Instagram adopted unusual spellings to circumvent hashtag modera-
tion techniques). 
273. See supra Part II. 
274. Issie Lapowsky, Why Tech Didn’t Stop the New Zealand Attack from Going Viral, 
WIRED (Mar. 15, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/new-zealand-shooting-
video-social-media [https://perma.cc/VE3L-MMV5]. 
275. Id. 
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cost to free expression.276  But in other contexts, such as defamation, hate 
speech, or terrorist propaganda, whether content is unlawful “depends on 
the overall context, including the message and precise wording.”277 
The challenge of designing automated systems to identify and sup-
press certain kinds of content highlights the more straightforward political 
difficulty of defining unlawful content in the first instance. Even if plat-
forms could automate the detection of terrorist propaganda, extremist con-
tent, or hate speech, defining those categories will be as difficult as 
identifying parody, fake news, or fair use.278  This inquiry is fact-bound 
and culturally specific.  With respect to all but the clearest cases, policy-
makers and platforms will find it difficult to apply these distinctions and 
determine the social value of user-generated content.  That this is a funda-
mental problem of free expression explains why automated decision-mak-
ing alone cannot answer the challenge. 
Of course, forcing humans to decide whether horrific content ought to 
be permitted or taken down creates its own problems. Content moderators 
often work in “sweatshop-like” conditions to clean up the Internet.279  Con-
tent moderators often experience serious trauma from viewing so many 
disturbing posts and images in quick succession.280  Some of them come 
to believe conspiracy theories expressed in moderated content.281  And 
contractors sometimes discourage moderators from raising questions to 
Facebook about unclear subjects, perpetuating the lack of clarity and 
apparent arbitrariness of some of these rules.282 
The human cost of content moderation will amplify calls for auto-
mated moderation techniques.  Facebook and other platforms play into 
this narrative, arguing that artificial intelligence can help platforms solve 
their content-related problems.283  But the platform may not be able to 
avoid using human content moderators. For example, under the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), individuals “have the right not to be 
subject to a decision based solely on automated processing . . . which pro-
duces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects 
276. Danielle Citron & Quinta Jurecic, Platform Justice 11– 12 (Hoover Inst. Aegis 
Series Paper No. 1811, 2018). 
277. Id. at 13. 
278. The Platform Is the Message, supra note 31, at 15 (“[I]dentifying and excluding 
fake news is a hard line-drawing problem.”). 
279. See Hanna Kozlowska, This Documentary Shows the Sweatshop-Like Labor of 
Internet Content Moderators, QUARTZ (Nov. 12, 2018), https://qz.com/1460906/the-
cleaners-is-a-documentary-that-shows-the-sweatshop-like-labor-of-content-moderators/ 
[https://perma.cc/XC56-AZ6F]. 
280. Casey Newton, The Trauma Floor: The Secret Lives of Facebook Moderators in 





283. James Vincent, AI Won’t Relieve the Misery of Facebook’s Human Moderators, 
VERGE (Feb. 27, 2019, 12:41 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/27/18242724/ 
facebook-moderation-ai-artificial-intelligence-platforms [https://perma.cc/6EXK-D4H8]. 
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him or her.”284  Even those who are most optimistic about the use of artifi-
cial intelligence to detect harmful online content acknowledge the vital role 
that human moderators play in deciding whether user-generated posts 
ought to remain online or be taken down.285 
D. Content Moderation as Power 
Finally, automation mandates may entrench the position of firms at 
the leading edge of AI development, such as Facebook and Google. In a 
climate of increasing sensitivity to technology platforms’ market domi-
nance, content regulation has proven attractive for opponents of “Big 
Tech.”286  However, some have argued that automation requirements are as 
burdensome as to exclude new start-ups and smaller competitors.287 
Moreover, as the developers of AI moderation tools, technology platforms 
such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter, and companies such as Crisp, 
Twohat, and Adobe stand to gain substantially from the expansion of auto-
mation mandates.288 
A full assessment of how content regulation might reshape competi-
tion is beyond the scope of this Article. But the experience of algorithmic, 
copyright enforcement confirms that commercial interests provide power-
ful motives for platforms to monetize their moderation systems by selling 
their services to competitors.289  As Bridy documented, Audible Magic— 
one of the chief purveyors of copyright filtering technology— lobbied the 
European Commission to require proactive filtering in Article 17.290 
284. Council Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/ 
EC, art. 22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 15, 65 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR]. 
285. Telephone Interview with Mark Zuckerberg, CEO, Facebook, Inc. (Apr. 2, 2019), 
available at https://www.fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/2019/04/25/facebook-inc-
fb-q1-2019-earnings-call-transcript.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZR42-YYTT] (“The only 
hope is building AI systems that can either identify things and handle them proactively 
or at the very least, flag them for a lot of people who work for us who can then look at 
them.”). 
286. Tim Mak, Senator Pushes Bill to Curb ‘Exploitative and Addictive’ Social Media 
Practices, NPR (Aug. 14, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/14/ 
750585438/senator-pushes-bill-to-curb-exploitative-and-addictive-social-media-practices 
[https://perma.cc/S8HQ-E8AG]. 
287. See James Temperton & Matt Reynolds, The European Parliament Has Voted in 
Favour of Article 13, WIRED (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/eu-article-
13-vote-article-17 [https://perma.cc/8MER-6MSF]. 
288. One major content moderation contractor, Cognizant, announced in fall 2019 
that it would exit the content moderation business, while allocating $5 million to 
research on automation and algorithmic moderation. Telephone Interview with Brian 
Humphries, CEO, Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp. (Oct. 30, 2019), available at 
https://www.fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/2019/10/31/cognizant-technology-
solutions-corp-ctsh-q3-2019-e.aspx [https://perma.cc/M6S6-9LE3]. 
289. See, e.g., BFDI Press Release, supra note 182 (raising concerns that large plat-
forms will sell their moderation systems to small platforms, cementing their 
dominance). 
290. See Annemarie Bridy (@AnnemarieBridy), TWITTER (Jan. 19, 2019, 6:06 PM), 
https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy/status/1086761804301094917 (citing a promo-
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Already, companies such as Adobe291 and Crisp292 are selling proprietary 
filtering software that purports to effectively filter hate speech and terrorist 
content.  Proactive monitoring requirements will create a vast, new market 
for automated moderation techniques.  These market effects will be present 
regardless of whether new regulations require the use of ex ante screening 
methodologies, or simply encourage them. 
E. Content Moderation as Extraterritorial Governance 
Pushing platforms to adopt automated, ex ante screening methodolo-
gies is a matter of global significance.  These changes send a signal to other 
governments— and to lobbyists— that domestic law can effectively require 
online service providers to be more proactive in filtering and monitoring 
content.293  As platforms build and acquire the technological infrastruc-
tures necessary to comply with European law, they are likely to use those 
infrastructures on a global scale, not only in their European affiliates.294 
Local content regulations have global effects in part because platforms 
prefer to enforce their terms of service before enforcing local law.295  As 
platforms increasingly automate the screening of user-generated content 
for compliance with their terms of service, content that violates community 
guidelines will be taken down globally.296  The global effects of takedowns 
combine with the problems of over-deletion. For instance, when service 
providers receive DMCA notices, they generally delete the content across 
the entire platform, rather than by blocking or filtering content within the 
U.S.297 
tional video regarding “content recognition technologies” in Article 17— previously 
referred to as Article 13). 
291. See, e.g., Content Management Meets AI with Adobe Experience Manager Sites, 
ADOBE, https://www.adobe.com/marketing-cloud/experience-manager/social-media-
moderation.html [https://perma.cc/SX4T-77US] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020). 
292. See, e.g., Crisp Solutions: Digital Marketing Defense, CRISP  THINKING, https:// 
www.crispthinking.com/content-moderation-for-social-networks [https://perma.cc/ 
DY3G-GR4D] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020). 
293. See, e.g., Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 44 (2012) 
(citing Katerina Linos’s work on legal diffusion). Indeed, organizations that represent 
rightsholders have already urged the United States Copyright Office to consider filtering 
and fingerprinting technologies as “standard technical measures” that should be 
required in order for companies to benefit from Section 512’s safe harbor. See also, e.g., 
Copyright Office of the United States of America, Comment Letter on Section 512 
Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, submitted by Jay Rosenthal & Steven 
Metalitz (Apr. 1, 2016), http://static.politico.com/a3/bf/686b5f2942dbb2b5327a8a 
2d8ceb/music-community-submission-in-re-dmca-512-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXZ9-
NDWV]. 
294. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21, at 29 (describing how platform terms of service 
generally apply globally, not locally). 
295. See, e.g., Amélie Heldt, Reading Between the Lines and the Numbers: An Analysis of 
the First NetzDG Reports, INTERNET POL’Y  REV., June 2019, at 1, 11 (documenting how 
platforms enforcing Germany’s NetzDG law tend to screen content against their commu-
nity guidelines before assessing compliance with local law). 
296. See also Extremist Speech, supra note 10, at 1055– 57. 
297. Annemarie Bridy, Intellectual Property, in LAW, BORDERS, AND SPEECH: PROCEED-
INGS AND  MATERIALS 13 (Daphne Keller ed., Stanford Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y 2017), 
available at https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/publication/files/12-18%20FINAL%20 
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These practices raise potent questions about the implications of new 
content regulations for jurisdictions. When governments misappropriate 
the instruments of private governance, they can often achieve— whether 
intentionally or not— global effects for public policy.  While issues such as 
data localization, data sovereignty, and extraterritoriality remain in the 
public eye, it is worth considering how content regulation itself manifests 
many of the same controversial aspects, like calling into question the con-
sent of the governed.298 
IV. Principles for Moderation of Automation 
By design, the new automated technologies of moderation not only 
promote and advance the interests of law enforcement, but they also culti-
vate a sense of mutual dependency in which states require platforms’ assis-
tance to vindicate policy objectives and platforms comply in order to avoid 
harder regulation.  Although this arrangement might seem “efficient,” in 
the sense that both, states and platforms, receive optimal outcomes with-
out costly interventions, they pose a threat to democratic values and safe-
guards.  While artificial intelligence and other automated content 
moderation tools hold substantial promise for scaling the work of content 
moderation, they come at a significant cost to civil liberties and are poised 
to entrench the power of the private sector. 
This Part concludes by pointing toward several ways in which regula-
tion might seek to exert a moderating influence upon the use of automa-
tion itself.  By recalibrating the regulatory balance away from the current 
emphasis on “scalability,” legislation and regulation might reach a health-
ier resolution that squares the challenges of harmful online content with 
public governance and with individual rights. 
A. Platform Transparency 
Several of the new measures require platforms to produce annual or 
semi-annual transparency reports documenting the actions they have taken 
to address unlawful content.299  But while transparency reports originated 
as a way for technology companies to notify users about demands for sur-
veillance and censorship, these new reporting obligations operate as a way 
for governments to ensure that platforms are keeping up with the uptick in 
Conference%20Proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8VJ-WFJ9] (“Has notice and take-
down for copyright become de facto harmonized through platforms’ global application 
of the DMCA?”). 
298. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 21, at 67– 68 (describing questions about legitimacy 
that arose from the emergence of governance institutions outside the state). 
299. See, e.g., NETZWERKDURCHSET  ZUNGSGESETZ [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement 
Act], Oct. 1, 2017, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FUR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ [BMJV] at¨ 
art. 1(2) (Ger.) (requiring social networks that receive over 100 complaints per year to 
produce semi-annual transparency reports); Draft Terrorism Regulation, supra note 189, 
at art. 8(2) (requiring service providers that have received removal orders to publish 
annual transparency reports). 
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censorship demands.300  In other words, transparency reports once served 
companies’ public relations goals by establishing their independence from 
the government.  Now, in an era of concern about platform impunity, com-
panies release data about content moderation in order to show compliance 
with government demands.301 
The existing transparency protections are woefully incomplete. The 
transparency-reporting obligations under NetzDG and the draft terrorism 
regulation require platforms to document their efforts to take down con-
tent that is the subject of a specific complaint, but do not fully capture 
companies’ decisions to deploy automated mechanisms that avoid com-
plaints arising in the first place.  For this reason, platforms ought to be 
more transparent about how, when, and why they deploy ex ante, auto-
mated screening of user-generated content. Precisely because laws like 
NetzDG, the Australian AVM law, and Article 17 of the Copyright Directive 
encourage— but do not require— automated content recognition, platforms 
have choices about whether or not to do so. Understanding how auto-
mated measures fit within the framework of content moderation is neces-
sary to have a fuller picture of the relationship between government 
pressure and private sector practices.302 
Perhaps more importantly, as Daphne Keller has pointed out, platform 
transparency reports can only present a highly limited perspective on con-
tent moderation that reflects “the platforms’ own characterization of the 
content they took down.”303  In its current form, aggregate data does not 
explain, for example, the kinds of content that are swept up by an 
algorithm designed to detect “terrorism,” nor the reasons that a platform 
might not identify “white nationalism” as “terrorist content.”304 
More robust transparency practices might shed some much-needed 
light on these shifting dynamics.  For example, platforms might routinely 
300. See Jonathan Manes, Online Service Providers and Surveillance Law Transparency, 
125 YALE L.J. F. 343, 344 (2016), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/online-service-
providers-and-surveillance-law-transparency [https://perma.cc/DE3D-38HL] (“If these 
companies could win the right to speak about the kinds of records the government is 
ordering them to disclose, they would be able to provide the public with crucial informa-
tion about how the surveillance laws have been interpreted and applied in practice.”). 
301. Mike Masnick, How Government Pressure Has Turned Transparency Reports from 




302. To its credit, the draft terrorism regulation requires government agencies as well 
as platforms to record removal orders. See Draft Terrorism Regulation, supra note 189, at 
art. 8(a).  Unfortunately, this requirement is skeletal, calling for governments to disclose 
data regarding removal orders, investigations, and content “wrongly identified as terror-
ist.” Id. In addition, government authorities must disclose a “description of measures” 
requested from service providers. Id. 
303. See Three Constitutional Thickets, supra note 185, at 8. 
304. Dı́az, supra note 129 (expressing the concern that GIFCT’s definition of “glorifi-
cation” of terrorism is “imprecise”); Nitasha Tiku, Tech Platforms Treat White Nationalism 
Different from Islamic Terrorism, WIRED (Mar. 20, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired. 
com/story/why-tech-platforms-dont-treat-all-terrorism-same/ [https://perma.cc/SB88-
WL7W]. 
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review and audit their algorithms and datasets to determine whether auto-
mated methods experience different error rates with different speakers, 
languages, or contexts, and then, publish the results.305  By the same 
token, platforms might disclose other statistical information that would 
show, for example, whether some types of speech garnered disproportion-
ate complaints under NetzDG or other statutory mechanisms. 
However, even robust audits and voluntary disclosures will lose credi-
bility if they are self-enforced and self-policed. Therefore, in addition to 
requirements that platforms publish aggregate data, regulators might con-
sider requiring algorithmic transparency mechanisms.306  A growing body 
of work has begun to critique the power of technology firms to “lock away 
information in the face of a strong public interest in disclosure.”307  With-
out legislative intervention, platforms are likely to treat their methodolo-
gies of algorithmic enforcement as “trade secrets,” just as they have 
vigorously sought to shield their policies on content moderation from pub-
lic disclosure.308 
A full review of the extensive literature on algorithmic transparency 
and accountability is beyond the scope of this Article.309  For our pur-
poses, it suffices to say that a regulator might opt to include provisions that 
would make automated, ex ante content screening less inscrutable, either 
by providing for government audits, facilitating independent research, or 
by requiring disclosure.310 
Transparency alone is not enough to ensure accountability, of 
305. Indeed, major technology platforms are at the forefront of research on artificial 
intelligence and machine learning, and, given the current distributions of resources, 
these platforms are likely the institutions best equipped to undertake these kinds of 
projects. See, e.g., AMAZON, https://www.aboutamazon.com/research [https://perma.cc/ 
CUA3-SKCB] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020); GOOGLE, https://ai.google/research/ [https:// 
perma.cc/9ZLE-ZU2W] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020); FACEBOOK, https://research.fb.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/9ELJ-ANFQ] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020); MICROSOFT, https://www.mi 
crosoft.com/en-us/research/ [https://perma.cc/L2RK-YAJ9 ] (last visited Apr. 16, 2020). 
306. See, e.g., Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of 
the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & 
SOC’Y 973, 974 (2016); Technological Due Process, supra note 11, at 1260; Transparency 
and Algorithmic Governance, supra note 11, at 4. 
307. Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission— Access, Fairness, and 
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1202 (2008). See also 
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1290 (2020); Dan 
L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 59 (2001). 
308. Burk & Cohen, supra note 307, at 67. 
309. See, e.g., Burrell, supra note 261, at 10; Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, 
Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 110 (2018); John 
Danaher, The Threat of Algocracy: Reality, Resistance and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & 
TECH. 245, 258 (2016); Nicholas Diakopoulos, Accountability in Algorithmic Decision 
Making, COMM. ACM, Feb. 2016, at 56, 60. 
310. See, e.g., What Do We Mean When We Talk About Transparency?, supra note 270, 
at 1529 (calling for more disclosure of disaggregated data with independent research-
ers). See also Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 
119 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 424 (2019). 
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course.311  That is why it is critical to pair transparency obligations with 
other commitments to public oversight and to check the power of the pri-
vate sector, including ongoing monitoring.312  But those who seek to cen-
sor and surveil also benefit from sub rosa arrangements that blur the line 
between the private and public sectors. Shedding light on those arrange-
ments is integral to holding these powerful institutions accountable. 
B. Procedural Safeguards 
Platforms and their regulators might also consider embracing more 
robust procedural safeguards that protect users who contest blocking and 
filtering decisions.  As Balkin recognized, digital filtering systems might 
tend to operate as “prior restraints” on speech that prevent individuals 
from speaking, rather than punishing them after-the-fact.313  Just as prior 
restraints call for specific kinds of procedural protections to guard against 
the risk of censorship, regulators might likewise integrate procedural safe-
guards— such as appeal mechanisms and judicial review requirements— 
into platform regulation.314 
Appeal mechanisms have gained substantial traction, especially as 
Facebook began ramping up its Oversight Board to review its content mod-
eration practices.315  These mechanisms need not be strictly private or vol-
untary.  For example, the Copyright Directive requires each platform to 
create an appeal mechanism for users to contest the removal of their con-
tent.316  Similarly, under the GDPR, individuals “have the right not to be 
subject to a decision based solely on automated processing.”317 
311. For critiques of this fallacy, see, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 
1361, 1365 (2016) (documenting how frequently the private sector uses transparency 
law in its own self-interest); David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom 
of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1146 (2017); Andrew Keane Woods, The 
Transparency Tax, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (2018). See also Woodrow Hartzog, Body Cam-
eras and the Path to Redeem Privacy Law, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1257, 1275– 77 (2018) (describ-
ing, in the context of body cameras, the concern that public transparency might be co-
opted for private sector gain). 
312. What Do We Mean When We Talk About Transparency?, supra note 269, at 
1527– 28; Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of 
Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1595 (2019) (suggesting that the ongoing monitor-
ing of platforms’ speech practices might be justified). 
313. Jack Balkin drew an analogy between digital filtering systems and prior 
restraints. Relying on this comparison, certain safeguards might be appropriate in the 
former context precisely because of their similarity to the latter. See Old-School/New-
School Speech Regulation, supra note 12, at 2318. 
314. Id. See also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58– 59 (1965) (articulating 
three safeguards). 
315. Casey Newton, Facebook’s Oversight Board Could Bring a Justice System to a Plat-
form That Needs One, VERGE (Sept. 18, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/inter-
face/2019/9/18/20870605/faceboook-oversight-board-charter-justice-system [https:// 
perma.cc/B37U-V4WQ]. 
316. Copyright Directive 2019/790, supra note 165, at art. 17(9). 
317. GDPR, supra note 284, at art. 22(1). See also Emily Pehrsson, The Meaning of the 
GDPR Article 22 1, 22 (Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Tech. Law Forum, Working Paper 
No. 31, 2018) (discussing whether Article 22 is an outright prohibition of automated 
decision-making or confers a “right to challenge” the outcome of an automatic decision). 
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Apart from substantive oversight of content-related decisions, appeals 
are also important because they play an integral role in promoting trans-
parency and legitimacy.  Through an appeals process, platforms might dis-
close information about the reasons that a piece of content is blocked or 
taken down to the individual users who are affected. Thus, through 
appeals, platforms (at least in theory) engage in a familiar kind of adminis-
trative reason-giving.318 
Appeal mechanisms have several major drawbacks, however. First, 
while they might make marginal improvements to transparency, they are 
opaque and ineffective protections against over-deletion.319  Second, like 
moderation itself, appeals present a problem of scale. Finally, requiring 
platforms to create expensive and burdensome appeal mechanisms threat-
ens small companies and start-ups while favoring dominant incumbents. 
Large online platforms can and do construct entire quasi-legal regimes 
for online speech, replete not only with statutes and regulations (terms of 
service and community guidelines), but also with legal structures (com-
plaints and appeals). Facebook’s Oversight Board (the Board) illustrates 
how one large company has approached this issue by designing an inde-
pendent body to oversee its content moderation decisions.320  In Novem-
ber 2018, Mark Zuckerberg announced that Facebook would create “a new 
way to appeal content decisions to an independent body.”321  The com-
pany then opened a “public consultation process” for six weeks to get pub-
lic feedback on the design of the Board.322  After holding a series of 
invitation-only workshops and roundtables, the platform published its 
draft Charter in September 2019.323  Under the Charter, the Board has the 
authority to consider appeals of content-related decisions.324  The Board 
can also set its own mechanisms for determining which “cases” to 
318. Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, 18 
NOMOS 126, 126 (1977). As Michelman points out, even what he calls “nonformal” 
explanations have significance for due process: they “seem responsive to demands for 
revelation and participation. They attach value to the individual[] being told why the 
agent is treating him unfavorably and to his having a part in the decision.” Id. at 127. 
319. See, e.g., What Do We Mean When We Talk About Transparency?, supra note 269, 
at 1537; URBAN ET AL., supra note 228, at 58; Censored, Suspended, Shadowbanned, supra 
note 52, at 4378– 79. 
320. Kate Klonick & Thomas Kadri, How to Make Facebook’s ‘Supreme Court’ Work, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/17/opinion/facebook-
supreme-court-speech.html [https://perma.cc/MYW9-QRX4]. 
321. Mark Zuckerberg, A Blueprint for Content Governance and Enforcement, 
FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerburg/a-blue 
print-for-content-governance-and-enforcement/10156443129621634 [https://perma.cc/ 
773G-CYQN]. 
322. Brent Harris, Getting Input on an Oversight Board, FACEBOOK (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/04/input-on-an-oversight-board/ [https://perma.cc/ 
LXG2-DNRK]. 
323. Brent Harris, Establishing Structure and Governance for an Independent Oversight 
Board, FACEBOOK (Sept. 17, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/oversight-
board-structure/ [https://perma.cc/3GJL-T55E]. 
324. Oversight Board Charter, FACEBOOK 1, 4– 5 (2019), https://fbnewsroom 
us.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/JCD9-
Q8YG]. 
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consider.325 
Despite the lengthy process for constructing the Board, the Charter is 
strikingly short on detail regarding some essential aspects of its proce-
dures.  For example, the Charter is silent on whether parties before the 
Board can be represented by counsel.326  The narrow scope of the Board’s 
jurisdiction— only individual content decisions can be appealed— is also 
questionable.  For instance, the Charter does not include specific provi-
sions regarding user appeals from decisions to disable their accounts, even 
though that might also be considered a content-related decision.327  Since 
Facebook does not offer appeals for all content-related decisions, there are 
presumably also some areas over which the Board will lack authority, such 
as child sexual abuse imagery.328 
The Charter also anticipates that the Board’s decision in one appeal 
might be binding on other content as well. First, the Board’s decisions are 
“precedential.”329  Yet, the Charter also notes that, “where Facebook identi-
fies that identical content with parallel context— which the Board has 
already decided upon— remains on Facebook, it will take action by analyz-
ing whether it is technically and operationally feasible to apply the Board’s 
decision to that content as well.”330  Thus, while the Board will lack author-
ity to decide cases arising from Facebook’s algorithmic delivery, curation, 
or ranking of content, the Charter also anticipates that the company might 
use its technical tools to instantiate Board decisions.331 
The effectiveness of Facebook’s new appeals mechanisms largely 
depends on factors that have yet to be publicly announced— namely, whom 
it appoints to the Board.332  And Facebook’s commitment to public partici-
pation, input, and careful drafting in the process of formulating the Char-
ter does not ensure that the Board’s approach to content governance will 
add anything more than a symbolic veneer of compliance with free expres-
325. Id. at 5. 
326. See generally id. 
327. Sarah C. Haan, Bad Actors: Authenticity, Inauthenticity, Speech, and Capitalism, 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 47 (forthcoming) (“[C]ompanies sometimes justify this approach 
on the ground that ‘authentic’ speakers produce ‘authentic content,’ which implies that 
content produced by authentic speakers is truthful and good.”). 
328. Understanding the Community Standards Enforcement Report, FACEBOOK, https:// 
transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement/guide [https:// 
perma.cc/D6NY-S4WV] (last visited June 22, 2020) (“[W]e offer appeals for the vast 
majority of violation types on Facebook. We don’t offer appeals for violations with 
extreme safety concerns . . . .”). 
329. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 324, at 5. 
330. Id. at 7. 
331. Dipayan Ghosh, Facebook’s Oversight Board Is Not Enough, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 
16, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/10/facebooks-oversight-board-is-not-enough [https:// 
perma.cc/X5PR-4H4R] (calling for “oversight of the company’s algorithmic decision-
making to protect against bias”). 
332. Jonathan Zittrain, A Jury of Random People Can Do Wonders for Facebook, ATLAN-
TIC (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/let-juries-
review-facebook-ads/601996/ [https://perma.cc/UP5R-2PVY] (“A bunch of retired 
judges or other thoughtful people on that board can, perhaps, deliberate, show their 
reasoning, and thus convince even those who don’t agree with them that the process 
wasn’t rigged against them.”). 




93 2020 Automation in Moderation 
sion values.333  Facebook’s effort to craft a participatory process— and its 
invocation of the analogy to a “Supreme Court”334— does not change the 
fact that this is a simulacrum of due process, unregulated by law or the 
Constitution, and therefore, unaccountable to the democratic process. In 
fact, Facebook’s grand experiment in constitutionalism just highlights that 
platforms are free to design their quasi-legal protections without any legal 
consequences or guarantees. 
Partly in response to these concerns, platforms, non-governmental 
organizations, and other stakeholders have considered a range of alterna-
tive options for private regulation to help rectify the imbalance, including 
multi-stakeholder Social Media Councils, or SMCs.335  SMCs are similar to 
Facebook’s Oversight Board in the sense that they are soft-law institutions, 
and that their success relies upon voluntary adherence.336  But in other 
respects, the similarity runs out.  Rather than the Facebook Oversight 
Board’s adjudicatory model, which focuses primarily on hearing individual 
user appeals, SMC proposals have focused on a multi-stakeholder model 
that would represent civil society organizations, platforms, users, and gov-
ernments and advise them on content moderation issues far beyond 
takedowns.337  Rather than being led by a single platform, SMCs can offer 
guidance on cross-cutting issues affecting multiple platforms or the social 
media sector more generally.338  SMCs might be global, national, or 
regional in scope.339 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the SMC proposals is that, 
unlike the Facebook Oversight Board, the fundamental business model of 
the platform need not be off-limits to the SMC. One can imagine a world in 
which the SMC’s adjudicatory and advisory functions go well beyond what 
platforms define as “content moderation” and address other issues as well: 
algorithmic ranking, advertising policy, and anonymity— to name just a 
few.  The potential breadth of the SMC concept, in turn, highlights how 
narrow Facebook’s mandate for the Oversight Board truly is. Precisely 
because SMCs are envisioned as multi-stakeholder institutions, they may 
have greater potential to shed light on the entwined relationships between 
333. CAROLYNN M. RYAN, INTERNAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2 (IRC Press 1998), available 
at https://irc.queensu.ca/sites/default/files/articles/communicating-during-an-organi-
zational-change.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECJ4-N7XJ] (observing that internal dispute res-
olution entails greater corporate control). 
334. Klonick & Kadri, supra note 320. 
335. Land, supra note 10, at 57– 59 (documenting different accountability 
mechanisms). 
336. Eileen Donahoe et al., Social Media Councils: From Concept to Reality, STAN. GDPI 
1, 24 (2019), https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/gdpiart_ 
19_smc_conference_report_wip_2019-05-12_final_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/32QQ-J9Y6] 
(describing how discussion of appointments to SMCs was partly a response to 
Facebook’s announcement that it would appoint the first Oversight Board). 
337. Id. at 26– 32 (presenting two potential models for SMCs). While the Article 19 
model emphasizes an adjudicatory role for SMCs, the GDPi model emphasizes their 
advisory function. Id. 
338. Id. 
339. Id. 
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platforms and states.  At the same time, however, SMCs would likely find it 
difficult to maintain financial independence without significant state and 
private-sector sponsorship, calling their neutrality into question. 
These proposals warrant fuller consideration, especially regarding 
their potential to realign— or reaffirm— the relationship between user 
speech, private power, and government censorship. In particular, the 
emergence of powerful corporate and multi-stakeholder institutions for 
resolving speech issues might raise questions about the long-standing 
assumption that government intervention is more dangerous to free speech 
than private action.340  But, at least for now, the emergence of the 
Facebook Oversight Board has dominated discussion of the potential for 
soft-law institutions to intervene in content moderation debates.341  It 
remains to be seen whether these new governance structures create more or 
less powerful safeguards against wrongful deletion, censorship, and 
surveillance. 
1. Court Orders 
In addition to appeal mechanisms, as Molly Land noted, many propos-
als to improve accountability for content moderation have focused on the 
need for formal legal processes— subject to judicial review— before a state 
can request that a platform delete content.342  Without formal mechanisms 
for ex ante judicial review and ex post remedies, government demands pose 
the serious risk of coopting not only platforms’ substantive decisions, but 
also their rules, regulations, and internal decision-making procedures. 
So-called IRUs, the law enforcement squadrons that flag illicit content 
online under private terms of service, highlight these risks. Most online 
platforms require a court order or other formal request to justify comply-
ing with a law enforcement demand to remove user content.343  However, 
IRUs operate as if they were ordinary users, flagging violations of the com-
munity standards just like any other individual.344  By employing a plat-
340. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press— A New First Amendment Right, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1642 (1967) (“[O]nly by responding to the present reality of the 
mass media’s repression of ideas can the constitutional guarantee of free speech best 
serve its original purposes.”). 
341. See generally, e.g., Evelyn Douek, Facebook’s Oversight Board: Move Fast with Sta-
ble Infrastructure and Humility, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2019); Kate Klonick, The 
Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent Institution to Adjudicate Online Free 
Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2232 (2020); Catalina Botero-Marino et al., We Are a New Board 
Overseeing Facebook. Here’s What We’ll Decide, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2020), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/opinion/facebook-oversight-board.html [https:// 
perma.cc/TU8U-62PN]; Newton, supra note 315. 
342. Land, supra note 10, at 57. 
343. See, e.g., Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport.google 
.com/government-removals/overview?hl=en [https://perma.cc/HAE6-UHG2] (last vis-
ited July 7, 2020) (describing types of requests from government entities); but see 
Facebook Transparency Report, FACEBOOK,  https://transparency.facebook.com/content-
restrictions [https://perma.cc/6ENF-P4TA] (describing how government entities some-
times request the deletion or restriction of unlawful content without specifying which 
method to use). 
344. Land, supra note 10, at 23– 24. 
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form’s community standards rather than the law itself, IRUs can achieve an 
end-run around legal constraints meant to guard against censorship: they 
can avoid judicial review and oversight. Obviously, this easier and more 
straightforward strategy is enticing, but its costs to free expression are 
significant. 
In response, advocates and scholars have stressed the urgency of 
requiring court orders and formal legal processes before state actors can 
demand content takedowns.345  While this approach is an important con-
straint on discrete government demands that might relate to individual 
users, posts, and pages, I am not confident that it addresses the broader 
dynamics raised by automation in moderation. In particular, discrete 
court orders are unlikely to address the greater tendency of platforms to 
adopt technological solutions and symbolic structures of compliance to 
avoid harder regulation.  Additionally, maintaining a focus on discrete gov-
ernment demands risks overlooking the emerging pressures on platforms 
to create new technologies and techniques of moderation. These new 
forms of government pressure might not take the same shape as the old 
demands to censor or surveil, but they will affect platforms’ design choices 
and their implementation of private governance structures. 
In other words, the risk that government actors might use informal or 
coercive processes to restrict speech and privacy is not limited to content 
takedowns or user-information demands but have increasingly extended to 
the design and implementation of platform rules and compliance systems. 
These kinds of coercive maneuvers are particularly powerful because they 
are part of a constellation of simultaneous, increasing pressures on plat-
forms.346  As a result, judicial orders for takedowns, while an important 
constraint on the state’s ability to demand that platforms carry out its cen-
sorship and surveillance objectives, seem ill-equipped to address the risk 
that platforms might overcompensate in order to seem eager to comply.347 
345. Id. at 64. See also Chang, supra note 132, at 124– 25. 
346. For example, anti-encryption measures have been enacted in the United King-
dom and Australia. See Lily Hay Newman, Australia’s Encryption-Busting Law Could 
Impact Global Privacy, WIRED (Dec. 7, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/ 
australia-encryption-law-global-impact/ [https://perma.cc/Z49X-LKZ2].  Moreover, 
states are increasingly demanding that platforms store data locally. See, e.g., Ronak D. 
Desai, India’s Data Localization Remains a Key Challenge for Foreign Companies, FORBES 
(Apr. 30, 2019, 2:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ronakdesai/2019/04/30/ 
indias-data-localization-remains-a-key-challenge-for-foreign-companies/ [https://perma. 
cc/EX7C-H96E].  And, of course, technology companies are facing more aggressive anti-
trust enforcement in Europe as well as in the United States. See Adam Satariano & 
Matina Stevis-Gridneff, Big Tech’s Toughest Opponent Says She’s Just Getting Started, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/19/technology/tech-regula-
tor-europe.html [https://perma.cc/UVW3-AQYC]. 
347. Daphne Keller (@daphnehk), TWITTER (Apr. 5, 2018, 10:44 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/daphnehk/status/981905519920103424 (sardonically labeling platforms’ 
eagerness to demonstrate their policing capabilities as #VorauseilenderGehorsam, a Ger-
man phrase meaning something along the lines of “preemptive obedience”). 
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Conclusion 
This Article has advanced three primary claims. First, the shift toward 
automated, ex ante content moderation was prompted and made possible 
by a legal architecture that insulated online intermediaries from liability 
and was intended to secure their independence. This architecture left 
space for intermediaries to develop new technologies and techniques that 
themselves became the law of moderation.  Second, today, those same tech-
nologies are sites of contestation, cooptation, and increasing government 
control for user speech and privacy— reflecting the convergence of platform 
and government interests in surveillance and control. Finally, for these 
reasons, the modern regulations of online content that I have outlined are 
best understood not as challenges to platform power, but rather as reflec-
tions of platforms’ own embeddedness in law enforcement, and vice versa. 
